The Queen’s Platinum Jubilee: what does the future hold for the monarchy? 

The Platinum Jubilee was a time for celebration, but it also provoked many questions about the future of the monarchy, and what it might look like under the next monarch. In this post, Robert Hazell and Bob Morris attempt to answer those questions, relying on their detailed knowledge of modern European monarchies.

The Platinum Jubilee was an occasion for celebration and relaxation rather than profound reflection about the monarchy and its future. But for Robert Hazell and Bob Morris it was an exceptionally busy weekend, as they responded to a deluge of media requests from around the world. These clustered around the same set of questions:

  • How can a hereditary monarchy be part of a modern democracy?
  • Will public support for the monarchy outlive support for the Queen?
  • What kind of King will Prince Charles be? What changes might he want to introduce?
  • What is the future of the monarchy in the realms, the 14 other countries around the world where the Queen is also head of state?

This post offers more detailed answers to these questions than allowed by brief media interviews. It does so through a comparative and constitutional law lens, based upon our co-edited book, The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchy

How can a hereditary monarchy be part of a modern democracy?

The first question is easily answered: there is no contradiction between monarchy and democracy, with some of the most advanced democracies in the world also being monarchies. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and New Zealand are countries which regularly feature at the top of the annual Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit: all are monarchies. They have survived as monarchies because the monarch no longer has any political power; the monarch reigns, but does not rule. Constitutional monarchs act on the advice of the elected government; if they fail to do that or otherwise step out of line, they risk losing their thrones. That was the lesson brutally learned by Edward VIII in the abdication crisis of 1936, but he was not the only European monarch forced to abdicate. The same fate befell King Leopold III of the Belgians in 1950, Grand Duchess Marie-Adélaïde of Luxembourg in 1919, and King Juan Carlos of Spain in 2014, when opinion polls showed that two-thirds of Spaniards felt he should abdicate.

Will public support for the monarchy outlive support for the Queen?

Monarchy as a system of government depends on the consent of the people as well as the government. If the people withdraw their support from monarchy as an institution, it is finished. That is how monarchy came to an end in referendums in Italy after the Second World War and in Greece in 1973-74. In all, there were 18 referendums held on the future of the monarchy in 10 different European countries during the last century. Not all led to the country becoming a republic: referendums have reaffirmed continuation of the monarchy in Denmark and Norway, and restoration of the monarchy in Spain.

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Should we codify the royal prerogative?

com.google.Chrome.vxw6lk.jpgThe recent controversy about the unlawful attempt to prorogue parliament and the judicial review that followed has given rise to renewed calls for the codification of the royal prerogative or the enactment of a written constitution. Anne Twomey argues that there are benefits to a looser prerogative power, and that experience in other countries has shown that codification should be undertaken with caution.

The recent controversy about the prorogation of parliament and the judicial review of its exercise in Miller No 2 (also known as Cherry/Miller) has again given rise to calls for the codification of the prerogative or the enactment of a written constitution.

A written constitution is not necessarily an antidote for ambiguity or interpretative discretion. The same issues that arose in Miller No 2 could also arise under a written constitution. For example, section 5 of the Australian Constitution confers upon the Governor-General of Australia the power to prorogue the federal parliament. In doing so, however, it does not delineate the scope of the power to prorogue and whether there are any internal limits on it. The term ‘prorogue’ would have to be interpreted in its historical context, as a prerogative power, and in a manner that is consistent with the principles that are derived from the constitution, including the principles of responsible and representative government

So what would happen if an Australian government requested the Governor-General to prorogue parliament for a significant period, in circumstances where it appeared to have lost confidence and to be seeking to frustrate the ability of parliament to fulfil is legislative and accountability functions? It is likely that Australian courts would face exactly the same issues as the UK Supreme Court did in Miller No 2, regarding justiciability, the scope of the power to prorogue and the application of fundamental constitutional principles. Simply setting out the existing power in legislation or a written constitution does not, of itself, resolve all questions as to its application.

While most prerogative powers have now been abrogated by legislation, there is usually a good reason while those that have survived as prerogative do so. It may be because of the need to exercise them in a quick and decisive fashion. Sometimes, codifying prerogatives in legislation, particularly where prescriptive conditions are included, can exacerbate problems about their use. Disputes are likely to arise about the interpretation of the application of the conditions, courts are likely to become involved in enforcing them, and the delay involved in litigation is likely to exacerbate any political crisis. Continue reading