This week sees the publication of Anthony Seldon and Tom Egerton’s new book, The Conservative Effect 2010-2024: 14 Wasted Years?. The book reviews the record of the Conservative Party in government across various topics. Constitution Unit Director Meg Russell contributed the book’s chapter on ‘Government, Parliament and the Constitution’, and summarises it here. 

A sustained period of Conservative government would normally be expected to usher in constitutional stability. But the reverse applied to most of the period 2010-24. During this time constitutional controversies were rarely far from the news, partly due to deliberately planned changes, but more often to radically shifting conventions and political behaviour. The direction of change was also very far from consistent. The initial coalition period primarily saw pressures towards greater constitutional pluralism, though Liberal Democrat ambitions were often held back by Cameron’s Conservatives. Later, any prospect of calm under single-party government was quickly punctured by Brexit, which eventually brought into question almost every aspect of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Boris Johnson’s populist approach, in particular, was characterised by wholesale disregard for constitutional norms.  

In 2012 Philip Norton emphasised that Conservative traditions valued constitutional conventions, parliament, and a strong government tempered by checks and balances, and might contemplate change that would ‘maintain, not destroy, the system’. This suggests that, if one commonality can be discerned across the 2010-24 period of constitutional extremes, it is its largely unconservative nature. 

The management of the government machine   

The Conservatives fought the 2010 general election on a manifesto committed to ‘cutting the scope of Whitehall, and cutting the cost of politics’. By 2015 civil service numbers had reduced by almost 20% – from around 470,000 to 390,000. But Brexit led them to rise again, to around 430,000 by 2020 and, thanks to Covid, they had effectively returned to pre-coalition levels by 2022. 

Despite its novelty and challenges, the advent of coalition government resulted in high levels of government stability. There was a refreshing reduction in ministerial turnover, and decision-making become more formalised and regularised – in contrast to the informal so-called ‘sofa government’ lamented in the Labour years. But likewise, a subsequent reversal in terms of stability and rule-based government proved to be rapid and stark.  

Cameron presided over two of the only three ever UK-wide referendums (plus the Scottish independence referendum in 2014). The Brexit referendum led to significant pressure and uncertainties in Whitehall – exacerbated by Cameron’s refusal to allow civil servants to prepare for a Leave result. Theresa May, who took over when he resigned after that result occurred, nonetheless respected traditional boundaries. But under her successor, Boris Johnson, civil servants were soon facing dilemmas regarding what behaviour from political masters they were prepared to withstand. His chief adviser Dominic Cummings threatened a ‘hard rain’ on the civil service, and various senior civil servants were effectively forced out. By September 2020 these included Whitehall’s most senior official, the Cabinet Secretary Mark Sedwill, amidst extraordinary accounts of Cummings’ role in his departure. During this period the ability of impartial officials to ‘speak truth to power’, as well as to maintain constitutional standards (further discussed below), was substantially weakened.  

Sunak’s arrival brought somewhat more calm, but even he didn’t always jump to the defence of the civil service – most notably, when Justice Secretary Dominic Raab was forced out over allegations of bullying. Like various other problems over standards, and the rule of law, Sunak often appeared trapped by the desire to placate his party’s rightwingers.  

The management of parliament  

Following the MPs’ expenses crisis of 2009, the Select Committee on the Reform of the House of Commons (the ‘Wright Committee’) presented proposals to strengthen the House of Commons and its reputation. Its three key recommendations were election of select committee chairs and members, establishment of a new Backbench Business Committee, and reform of overall timetabling in the House of Commons, including a cross-party House Business Committee. The first of these changes was agreed shortly before the election, and the second put in place by the coalition. The third, despite appearing in the coalition agreement, and having strong backing from the Liberal Democrats, never materialised. Nonetheless these changes did facilitate more effective parliamentary scrutiny.  

But the 2016 referendum later fundamentally changed relations between government and the House of Commons. Under Theresa May, a government with a bare majority (and after 2017, no majority at all) was forced to pursue a policy that was deeply divisive – including in her own party.  

Unsurprisingly, the Prime Minister sought to bypass parliament when she could. Her successor Boris Johnson went even further to shut parliament out, or even to shut it down – in the 2019 prorogation, later reversed by the Supreme Court. Both he and May engaged in fierce anti-parliamentary rhetoric. The Brexit process also saw a huge rise in the use of delegated legislation (which receives little to no parliamentary scrutiny), boosted further by the Covid pandemic. Altogether, the Commons was significantly sidelined over this period. Rishi Sunak inherited a weakened culture of scrutiny and parliamentary accountability and made little attempt to change it.  

The 2010-24 period also demonstrated some fundamental changes in the relationship between the Conservatives and the House of Lords. 

Historically, the Conservatives had been natural defenders of the Lords, which served as a powerbase for the party. It was Liberal and Labour governments that faced challenge by the chamber. Hence when Nick Clegg attempted radical Lords reform, it was Conservative MPs who effectively blocked his plans. 

But Labour’s 1999 reforms, removing most hereditary peers, had weakened the Conservatives in the chamber. The coalition masked this (with the Conservatives able to rely on Liberal Democrat votes), but it started to be felt after single party government returned in 2015. That autumn Chancellor George Osborne faced resistance from peers on his reform of tax credits, resulting in a review suggesting weakening the chamber’s powers. This relationship never really recovered. 

A major problem was over-appointment to the House of Lords. Cameron appointed 245 peers in just six years and the chamber’s size increased from approximately 750 to 850. Eventually the Lord Speaker – well-respected former Conservative Cabinet minister Lord (Norman) Fowler – established a Committee on the Size of the House, which recommended far stricter limits on appointments. Theresa May broadly accepted these principles, but Johnson flouted them, and also became the first Prime Minister to overrule a propriety recommendation of the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC).  

On the Conservatives’ watch, the status of the House of Lords was severely damaged, further damaging the power of parliament as a whole.  

The management of constitutional standards  

John Major’s Conservative government, in response to allegations of ‘sleaze’, took important actions to deal with perceptions of impropriety and poor standards – most notably, establishing the Committee on Standards and Public Life (CSPL). Changes under Labour 1997 – 2010 built on these achievements, creating or strengthening other constitutional regulators. 

But regulation of standards became more politicised post-2016, notably following the Electoral Commission’s rulings against Vote Leave. There were concerns about ministerial standards, including the chief official at the Home Office resigning in early 2020, accusing Home Secretary Priti Patel of briefing against him and of bullying departmental staff. An inquiry by the Prime Minister’s Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests concluded that Patel had broken the Ministerial Code; but Boris Johnson refused to act against her, causing the adviser to resign. There were likewise concerns about public appointments, and Johnson’s Elections Bill compromised the independence of the Electoral Commission. Johnson also sought, ultimately unsuccessfully, to weaken the House of Commons standards regime over the case of his ally Owen Paterson. Various other conventions were brought into question or breached. For example Johnson hinted strongly that he would not obey a statute (the ‘Benn-Burt Act’, to extend the Article 50 period), and supporters briefed that he might even refuse to surrender office if subject to a parliamentary no-confidence vote. His disregard for international law in the UK Internal Market Bill caused the Permanent Secretary to the Government Legal Department to resign. But the single most high-profile standards problem was ‘partygate’: revelations about serious breaches of Covid rules in Downing Street. Johnson’s own misleading of the House of Commons over these matters saw him referred to its Privileges Committee, and ultimately resigning from parliament. This was an extraordinary and ignominious end to a prime ministerial career. 

Rishi Sunak’s first speech upon becoming Prime Minister included a commitment to lead a government of ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’. But while signalling a desire to distance himself from the Johnson years, he in practice struggled to do so.  

Government, parliament and constitution: an assessment 

Despite natural expectations of constitutional calm, probably in no other area of policy during 2010-24 has the Conservative Party been more divided than over matters of governance itself. Certainly if Brexit is classed as a question of governance, this area wins hands down. There may also be no other area of policy in which reversals across this 14-year period were so stark, not just thanks to differences between the Conservatives and their initial governing partners the Liberal Democrats, but because of those same splits inside the party. 

David Cameron’s attitude to questions of government and parliament could be seen as consistent with those of earlier centrist Conservatives – resistant to radical change, for example of the voting system, control of the House of Commons, or Lords reform. After his departure as Prime Minister, however, developments swerved increasingly wildly away from what could be considered the party’s traditions. Theresa May was a respecter of propriety and convention. But she proved unable to build relationships with others outside her party over Brexit in order to freeze out her increasingly dominant internal Eurosceptic opponents. This helped to lay the ground for the populist, anti-pluralist, Johnson premiership.  

Johnson sought to exploit public frustration (particularly among Brexit supporters) with traditional institutions such as parliament and the courts that Conservatives could have been expected conventionally to defend, and bent almost every possible constitutional convention. Rishi Sunak’s premiership initially steadied matters, but bore clear scars of the earlier conflicts – many of which had played out in the Conservative Party itself.  

In summary, much of what happened between 2010 and 2024 on government, parliament and the constitution was very unconservative indeed. 

The Conservative Effect, 2010–2024: 14 Wasted Years? is available to order now. Meg Russell contributed the book’s chapter on ‘Government, Parliament and the Constitution’, 

This is the latest in a series of posts that discuss the 2024 general election and the past 14 years of Conservative government Sign up via the box in the left-hand sidebar to receive email notifications when a new post goes live. 

About the author

Meg Russell FBA is Professor of British and Comparative Politics at UCL and Director of the Constitution Unit.