Data-driven campaigning: the shape and perils of the modern election campaign

Political parties have access to an array of data that can potentially inform how they campaign. Kate Dommett, co-author of a new book on the subject, explains what data-driving campaigning is, the different ways in which parties use it, the problems it can cause, and how it might impact the next UK general election.

Imagine yourself running a party’s election campaign. Your mission in the run up to polling day is to develop a strategy for securing electoral victory or an increased vote share. You know that according to the latest social science research that campaigns can have important, if small effects on electoral outcomes. You know you will need to work to locate existing supporters and encourage them to turn out and cast their vote. You will also likely need to persuade undecided voters of the virtues of your party. And you will need to contact activists and motivate them to get involved in the campaign by donating money, attending campaign events or sharing party messages.

The key to all these activities is being able to communicate with the right audience. You do not want to be sending a reminder to vote to supporters of your opponents, and you do not want to waste money sending advertisements intended to persuade people who already plan to vote for you. You therefore need to gather and sort information about people’s voting behaviour to develop tailored messages. You also need to work out what messaging and mediums are most effective for achieving your desired goals. What slogans have the desired effect, what appeals prompt donations, and what campaign action most effectively reminds people to vote?

This form of campaigning is nothing new, but in recent years the availability of new forms of data, the emergence of new and more sophisticated techniques for profiling voters, and new mediums for contact are seen to have heralded a form of ‘data-driven campaigning’. Rather than relying on their gut instinct, party campaigners now use data and analytics insights to construct their campaign as never before. And yet, whilst increasingly common, our understanding of what exactly is captured by the term data-driven campaigning is often opaque.

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Election replay with the experts: looking back at the 2019 general election

luke_moore1_500x625_0.jpgThe 2019 general election is now complete, but there is still plenty to say about the campaign, the rules that governed it, and the new parliament it has produced. Luke Moore summarises the contributions at our final seminar of 2019, where Unit staff were joined by other experts to dicuss the lessons of the election.

On Monday 16 December the Constitution United hosted an event entitled Election Replay with the Experts, at which four leading political scientists, including the Director and Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit, looked back on the 2019 general election. The issues discussed included polling, women’s representation, the rules of the electoral game, and the effect of the election on the new parliament. The event was chaired by Unit Research Associate Lisa James

Ben Lauderdale – polling 

Ben Lauderdale, Professor of Political Science at UCL, started the evening by discussing the performance of polling at the election. During the election campaign Lauderdale had been involved in producing the much-discussed ‘MRP’ (multilevel regression and post-stratification) polling used to predict constituency results. His central message was that after two general elections — in 2015 and 2017 — in which some of the polls proved to be significantly out of step with the results, polling for the 2019 election is largely a non-story, as most pollsters were on target in their predictions. Further, the accuracy of the polls meant that the media was (in retrospect and in Lauderdale’s view) discussing the right topics during the election campaign. The most important of these was the prospect of a Conservative majority, but also the specific demographic and geographic weaknesses of the 2017 Labour coalition. While the terminology was a bit reductive and silly, it was not wrong to have focused on the vulnerability of Labour’s ‘red wall’ and Conservative appeals to ‘Workington man’.  Continue reading

Second forecast for the EU referendum

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Stephen Fisher and Alan Renwick have developed a method for forecasting the outcome of the EU referendum based on current vote intention polling and analysis of opinion polling from previous referendums in the UK and around the world. Last month, in their initial forecast, they suggested that Remain had an 87 per cent chance of winning. In this second forecast this has now dropped to 73 per cent. 

A month ago we issued our first forecast for the EU membership referendum on 23 June . Based on an analysis of referendums in the UK and on the EU outside the UK, and on vote intention opinion polls we forecast that Remain had an 87 per cent chance of winning, and that Remain would get 58 per cent of the vote, plus or minus 14. This was in part based on our polling average (excluding don’t knows) of 55 per cent for Remain on 11 March.

Our current forecast suggests that the contest is a fair bit closer. Our polling average now puts Remain on 52 per cent. We now give Remain a 73 per cent chance of winning and estimate that the Remain share of the vote will be 54 per cent, plus or minus 13 points.

The key change here is the drop from 55 per cent to 52 per cent for Remain in the polling average. The main reasons for this are as much or more methodological than substantive.

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The campaign and general election in review

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This year’s general election result took almost everyone by surprise, including the pollsters, forecasters and other experts. On 3 June, Joe Twyman, Dr Ben Lauderdale, Dr Rosie Campbell, Professor Justin Fisher and Professor Matt Goodwin took part in a roundtable to discuss where the predictions went wrong and lessons for 2020. David Ireland offers an overview of the event.

The exit poll that came out at 10pm on 7 May took almost everyone by surprise. Over the course of Friday morning, the scale of the Conservative majority revealed itself, showing that even the exit poll had underestimated the Conservative support. What happened? How did the polls get it so wrong and what are the lessons for 2020? This blog highlights the key issues from a recent roundtable on GE2015 hosted by UCL’s Department of Political Science and the Constitution Unit and chaired by Dr Jennifer Hudson. 

Joe Twyman, Head of Political and Social Research, YouGov

As one of many pollsters who had long predicted a hung parliament, Joe acknowledged YouGov didn’t get it right this time. He also, rather humorously, showed the range of Twitter abuse directed at him as a result.

Voting intention remained tightly balanced in the months leading up to the election, but YouGov’s polling revealed that the ‘fundamentals’ may not have been given enough weight in predicting vote share.Importantly, no party had ever come from behind on the economy and leadership to won an election before, and this election was not to be the first. The economy remained the single most important issue, and here, the Conservatives were significantly ahead. Similarly, Miliband never got close to Cameron on party leader ratings.  Continue reading

The Shy Tory: A credible hypothesis or mediatic oversimplification?

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Marco Morucci and Sally Symington test the ‘Shy Tory’ hypothesis that has been mooted as the explanation for the polls’ failure to predict the election outcome and find it unconvincing.

The release of exit polls on 7 May was a moment of shock and awe for political scientists, pollsters and forecasters across the UK: polls and subsequent predictions had grossly underestimated both the vote share for the Conservative party as well as their share of seats.

Hungry for a quick and simple explanation of the phenomenon, the mainstream media and commenting classes were quick in bringing up the ‘Shy Tory’ hypothesis. The adage dates back to 1992 and goes something like this: right-wing voters felt cornered by the adversarial and negative propaganda directed at them by the left wing, prompting them to feel safer in withholding their voting intention on surveys by either answering they’re undecided or won’t vote.

The theory has received little real scrutiny nor been critically evaluated despite the self-reinforcing coverage it has been given since the election, to the extent that it has now morphed into ‘Lying Tories’. However, some pollsters and experts have already manifested their doubts on its value. It presents a number of flaws that discourage its adoption as a principal explanation for the polls.

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