Why we need a Committee for Future Generations in the House of Lords

88q98 (1)The Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development has proposed that the House of Lords establish a Committee for Future Generations to review legislation. It is hoped that such a body would reduce the short-termism that can creep into legislative and executive decision-making. Graham Smith explains why this Committee is needed and how it could work in practice.

The problem of short-termism in democratic politics is well understood. Psychologically, we all tend to prioritise more immediate concerns over long term considerations. Our electoral cycles of four to five years mean that politicians and political parties typically think in those timescales. Long-term issues are often complex and thus are difficult to deal with in the policy silos of government. Future generations by definition are not present and thus have no direct representation within decision making processes.

Some of the most challenging issues we face run against these tendencies, requiring us to take a long-term perspective and consider the interests of future generations. Rapid technological development, inter-generational economic opportunity, welfare and social care provision, or environmental challenges such as climate change all fit into ‘the too difficult box – the big issues that politicians can’t crack’ identified by former Labour minister Charles Clarke. The problem of ‘short-termism’ in politics was explored in detail by the international Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations in its 2013 report, Now for the Long Term. The Commission recommended that, as a matter of urgency, governments invest in ‘innovative institutions… independent of the short-term pressures facing governments of the day but appropriately accountable to the political system in question.’ Such institutions ‘should be charged with conducting systematic reviews and analysis of longer-term issues.’ Continue reading

A Code of Constitutional Standards

The Constitution Unit of University College London is today publishing a report which sets out a code of constitutional standards based on the reports of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution. Since 2001 the Committee has made many recommendations in its reports, and the goal of this report was to codify these recommendations in order to make the Committee’s analysis of the constitution more accessible. The report, by Robert Hazell, Dawn Oliver and myself, contains a code of 126 constitutional standards, each of which is relevant to the legislative process, and each of which has been extracted from the 149 reports of the Constitution Committee that were reviewed. The standards are organised into five sections: the rule of law; delegated powers, delegated legislation and Henry VIII clauses; the separation of powers; individual rights; and parliamentary procedure.

The Constitution Committee’s formal terms of reference were set by the House of Lords Liaison Committee when it was established in 2001 and have not changed since then: ‘to examine the constitutional implications of all public Bills coming before the House; and to keep under review the operation of the constitution’. The Constitution Committee decided against drawing up a formalised code of constitutional norms in their first report to inform their bill scrutiny, instead the Committee adopted a pragmatic approach. The Committee identifies the norms that are relevant to each particular bill or inquiry in question. This flexible approach has a number of advantages, but one disadvantage is that the Committee’s conception of the normative foundations of the constitution is not easily accessible.

The first aim of the code in this report is to make the normative foundations of the Committee’s work more accessible. As part of their work, the Committee has made choices about what the constitution means in the context of the legislative process. It is these choices that the code seeks to highlight. It is important to note that the Committee advanced many of the cited standards in relation to particular bills, and did not put them forward as generalised standards. There is little doubt that if the Committee were to advance its own code of constitutional standards, it would look different to the code within this report. Nevertheless, the code does represent an accurate summary of the constitutional norms that the Committee has sought to uphold in its work since it was established in 2001.

In terms of the content of the code, it is noteworthy that many of the standards appear to be derived from the principles that underpin the parliamentary process. For example, standards that seek to regulate the use of fast-track legislation are not just general principles of good governance, nor are they are based on a particular constitutional principle, but rather they are derived from the normative foundations of the parliamentary process itself. Such standards serve to protect the integrity of the parliamentary process. This focus on parliamentary norms demonstrates the value of giving a parliamentary committee the task of assessing the constitutional implications of government bills. It has enabled the Committee to articulate the normative implications of the principles that form the foundations of the parliamentary process.

The second aim of the code is to provide a resource for those involved in the legislative process. It is widely recognised that one of the disadvantages of the United Kingdom’s uncodified constitution is that it is not easily accessible, and within Parliament the task of pointing out the constitutional implications of bills often falls to constitutional experts, particularly in the Lords, and the relevant committees. If the norms of the constitution were more readily accessible, it would be reasonable to expect more parliamentarians to engage with them during the legislative process. By publishing this code, it is hoped that parliamentarians, and others involved in the law-making process will make use of the standards within it during their scrutiny. The code might also be used by the Constitution Committee to develop its own code of legislative or constitutional standards.

The third aim is to contribute to the debate on the value of legislative standards within the legislative process in Westminster. In an earlier blog post, I put forward a critique of the code of legislative standards developed by the House of Commons Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform in their report titled ‘Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation’. In that post, I argued that although their code would represent a significant step forward, I thought it did not go far enough. Since that post, the Government has issued its response to the PCRC’s report. The Government could not be clearer – it does not think that a code of legislative standards is a good idea (paras 12-15). It suggests that the Cabinet Guide to Making Legislation is all that is needed for parliamentarians to judge the standard of the Government’s approach. Further, the Government argued that the PCRC’s code would risk encouraging a ‘box-ticking mentality’, and they point out that the code does not provide the ‘degree of objectivity it envisages.’ The latter point is surprising because the PCRC’s code makes every effort to be as ‘neutral’ as possible.

The Government appears to have misinterpreted the rationale for a code of soft law standards. The idea is to stimulate parliamentary debate on aspects of bills to which the standards relate, rather than to introduce an objective box-ticking exercise. The presence of parliamentary sovereignty and the absence of a codified constitution are sometimes taken to mean that Government and Parliament legislate into a normative vacuum. That somehow parliamentary sovereignty means that the government does not have to justify why a bill seeks to depart from the existing norms of the constitution. That idea, as Murray Hunt has recently argued in Parliament and the Law, is antithetical to any meaningful idea of constitutionalism. A code of constitutional standards is designed to challenge the myth of the normative vacuum and to raise the standard of justification within the legislative process, but without legally limiting Parliament’s legislative capacity. In this sense a code of soft law standards does not represent a threat to the political nature of the legislative process, as the code would always the subject of debate, and could be changed by purely political means. Soft law constitutional standards developed within Parliament might even find support from political constitutionalists, because they serve to enhance the quality of parliamentary debate by focusing the minds of parliamentarians on the value of the political process and the norms that form its basic architecture. Even if the standards are prescriptive, this does not mean that they cannot be departed from. The value of a code of soft law standards does not depend on them being complied with all of the time, instead it depends on then being used as the basis for debate and justification within the legislative process.

There seems to be little to lose and everything to gain from making more use of soft law codes of standards in Westminster. As this code demonstrates, committees within Parliament are already articulating the normative standards that are vital to the integrity of the parliamentary process. The challenge is to maximise the benefits of this work by making those standards as accessible and as influential as possible. It is hoped that this code makes a small contribution to this aim.