Tag Archives: Francis Maude

The Maude report: institutional fixes for political problems

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Cat Little today takes over as Cabinet Office permanent secretary at a time when how the centre of government operates is the subject of much debate. One recent report, overseen by former minister Francis Maude, was commissioned by the government and then shelved as soon as it was published. Max Emmett argues that it largely suggested institutional fixes to political problems and that successful reform will require strong ministerial support.

Introduction 

The Independent Review of Governance and Accountability in the Civil Service is not a plan for civil service reform. The report’s author, former Cabinet Office Minister, Lord (Francis) Maude of Horsham, was explicit at a event hosted by the Institute for Government that the report should not be understood as an attempt to fix the problems of the civil service, but contains recommendations for the preconditions needed for effective and long lasting change. Whilst Maude outlines a number of critiques of the civil service – its closed culture, reliance on generalists, churn and emphasis on policy over implementation, among others – his recommendations generally do not focus on solving these specific problems. 

What the Maude report aims to do is to provide both diagnosis and solutions to why these problems, well known and longstanding as they are, have not been effectively dealt with in government. The report highlights ineffective leadership and accountability for the civil service, in particular for the reform agenda, and an institutional centre ill-equipped to manage it. The proposed solutions include major reforms to the centre of government. Many of the functions of the Cabinet Office and the Treasury would be merged into a new Office of Management and Budget with the remaining cabinet support functions folded into an expanded Prime Minister’s department and the Treasury’s economic policy and tax raising functions remaining in a smaller more economy-focused department. The new Office of Management and Budget would be led by a permanent secretary-level civil servant who would act as the Head of the Civil Service and be responsible for driving forward the reform agenda. The Cabinet Secretary would lose their Head of the Civil Service role and retain their position as the most senior civil service advisor to the Prime Minister. 

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The civil service: what is its role?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Recent years have seen significant tensions between ministers and civil servants, with allegations of bullying by ministers and leaking by civil servants, and a number of permanent secretaries forced out. This has prompted debate about reform. Lisa James, Meg Russell, and Alan Renwick argue that any changes to the form and functions of the civil service should have at their heart the core civil service principles of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.

Background

The civil service is a vital part of the UK’s constitutional system, and is central to helping the government of the day to develop and implement policy. Nonetheless, there are perennial tensions and questions about its role, which have heightened in recent years. The volume and tenor of recent attacks by some politicians on the civil service have provoked particular concern.

This briefing explains the role of the UK civil service, and how it works with ministers. Some civil servants have frontline delivery roles – for example, jobcentre workers, border officials and prison officers. But the briefing focuses on those civil servants who work in central government departments, particularly those working with and around ministers on policy.

What is the role of the civil service?

The UK civil service is permanent and politically impartial. Civil servants continue in post when governments change, and are forbidden from offering political advice to ministers – a role performed instead by special advisers. They must also maintain individual impartiality (which precludes, for example, senior civil servants engaging in party political activities even outside their work).

However, the civil service is not independent. Its fundamental role is to serve actively the government of the day in policy development and delivery. This does not simply mean following ministers’ instructions: good governance requires ministers to draw on a range of objective, evidence-based advice and balanced perspectives before making decisions. Hence civil servants provide such advice on the pros and cons of policy options – even if that sometimes contains unwelcome messages. Civil servants also translate policy decisions into action, implementing the policy direction set by ministers.

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Constitution Unit publishes new study on non-executive directors in Whitehall

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In 2017, the Constitution Unit conducted the first-ever study of the work of non-executive directors (NEDs) within Whitehall. In this blog post, project leader Robert Hazell and Lucas Chebib, one of the project’s research volunteers, discuss the methodology and findings of the report. 

The Constitution Unit has just completed the first major study of non-executive board members in Whitehall (commonly known as non-executive directors, or NEDs). The report concluded that non-executives are high calibre, committed people, whose expertise is greatly valued by the civil service. However, NEDs themselves often said they find the role frustrating, and feel they could be much more effective if the system only allowed.

The study was carried out over 18 months by four former senior civil servants, with assistance from five research volunteers. The team compiled a detailed database of all NEDs; organised a survey; conducted almost 70 interviews; and tested their findings in private briefings and seminars. The full report is published here; what follows is a summary of the main points. Continue reading →

Will Ministers want an EMO?

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Whitehall has a new acronym – the EMO.  Not some exotic bird, but Extended Ministerial Offices, first announced by Francis Maude in July.  Last week Cabinet Office published guidelines fleshing out the details: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/261358/November_-_EMO_Guidance_to_Departments.pdf

EMOs will have three categories of staff: civil servants in the traditional Private Office role, Special Advisers, and external appointees.  The main expansion is likely to be in the third category, and the Civil Service Commission have created a new exception to allow recruitment without competition of chosen individuals as temporary civil servants for up to five years.  The previous maximum was two years: the new exception will allow outsiders to be recruited for the whole of a Parliament.

Ministers who want an EMO will need first to agree the mix of staff and the budget with their Permanent Secretary, before seeking the approval of the Prime Minister.  The budget must come within the department’s overall allocation.  The main quality control will come from Cabinet Office and the PM’s Chief of Staff in scrutinising EMO proposals: the PM is unlikely to give this his personal attention.  A few Ministers may go up from two Special Advisers to three.  But the main test will lie with the external appointees: will they be additional cheerleaders, or serious policy experts?  No 10 will be alert to negative headlines (eg The Times 19 November) and may be tight in what they allow through.

There are two twists in the tail for Ministers who want an EMO.  The first is that at least one member of the EMO must focus on implementation, reporting to the Head of the Cabinet Office Implementation Unit. So there is a direct line reporting line from the EMO to the centre on whether the department is meeting its targets.  The second is that requests must include ‘specific proposals for strengthening the offices of junior Ministers … of a different party’.  Where no EMO is planned, junior ministers can put forward their own proposals.  This is primarily to strengthen the support for the dozen Lib Dem junior ministers scattered round Whitehall, who feel isolated and outgunned. But it will require courage for them to go it alone: they must discuss their proposals first with their Secretary of State, who may not want to give the Lib Dems additional firepower.

Will many Ministers want an EMO?  In the remainder of this Parliament that seems unlikely.  Maude will have to have one, to set an example; but only a handful of colleagues may follow.  Energetic Ministers like Gove have already found ways of recruiting additional advisers, and may not want to seek approval from the centre.  And outsiders may be reluctant to sign up for an 18 month passage when the ship is beginning to run out of steam and they may be paid off in 2015.  So the real test will be in the next Parliament.  In an interview with Civil Service World Labour’s shadow Cabinet Office  spokesman Jon Trickett said that he supported the government’s plans for EMOs [link – http://www.civilserviceworld.com/trickett-civil-service-reforms-ad-hoc-with-hectoring-tone/].  But that was off the cuff, in the margins of the Labour party conference; we don’t know Miliband’s views.   If we have another hung Parliament, the future of EMOs might depend not on Francis Maude, but on the Lib Dems carrying his idea into the next government if they hold the balance of power.