As a result of the temporary measures taken by the UK House of Commons, MPs as far away from London as Orkney have been able to contribute to parliamentary proceedings remotely. The same has not been true of Ireland, where legal objections have been raised. David Kenny argues that those objections can be easily overcome and that there is no good reason why Ireland’s elected representatives should not be able to attend the Oireachtas remotely.
The strange circumstances of the pandemic have thrown up yet another constitutional issue, one which is arising around the world: where and how can the legislature sit? With social distancing in a parliamentary chamber or committee room difficult, this has a profound effect on how the legislature can function at a time where the agglomeration of executive power in response to the crisis requires acute parliamentary oversight.
At present, despite emergency legislation giving sweeping powers to the executive to combat COVID-19, neither house of the Irish parliament is meeting in anything other than the most limited form. For limited purposes, such as attempting to nominate a Taoiseach, a very large space such as Dublin’s Convention Centre can be rented to allow socially distant attendance from all 160 members of the Dáil (the equivalent of the UK’s House of Commons). But this is not intended to be a regular arrangement, and is not planned for other parliamentary activities, such as committee meetings. There are limited sittings in the Dáil Chamber, with a select groups of members in attendance, and meetings of a special COVID-19 Committee in the chamber also. It would seem that virtual/remote meetings would be essential to allow sufficient parliamentary oversight in these circumstances. But constitutional objections to this have been raised.Continue reading →
Earlier this year, the International Association of Constitutional Law published a blog symposium on Irish Unification: Processes and Considerations, convened by Professor Oran Doyle. Here, Professor Doyle summarises the contributions to the symposium.
The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (GFA)—the agreement between the parties in Northern Ireland and the related international treaty between the British and Irish governments that was central to the peace settlement in 1998—built a new model of power-sharing politics on the foundation of a territorial compromise. On the one hand, Ireland and Irish nationalists accepted the legitimacy of Northern Ireland’s status as a component part of the United Kingdom. They thereby relinquished a territorial claim to the whole island of Ireland that had been advanced in different ways since independence and partition of the island of Ireland in 1921-22. On the other hand, the United Kingdom and unionists accepted that Northern Ireland would only remain part of the United Kingdom for as long as a majority of people in Northern Ireland so wished it. They thereby relinquished the right of the United Kingdom to preserve its own territorial boundaries.
In 1998, Irish unification seemed a distant prospect. The priority for most Irish nationalists—and certainly for all Irish governments—was to make the new political arrangements work, not to advocate for a united Ireland. But demographic change was slowly producing an electorate more open to unification, and Brexit has now dramatically increased the attractiveness of a united Ireland replete with EU membership. As a result, although opinions on the likelihood of a united Ireland diverge widely, the territorial compromise of 1998 is under pressure. Continue reading →
If Ireland’s new government can stay in power, its term looks set to be dominated by one referendum after another. Five referendums have been promised, with the possibility of even more. David Kenny discusses the issues that Irish voters are set to be consulted on over the next few years. He writes that recent experience suggests that referendum fatigue is likely: whilst high-profile issues will continue to generate significant interest, many of the proposed referendums are unlikely to be greeted with enthusiasm by the electorate.
Any change to the 1937 Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann) – however minor – requires ratification by a majority of voters in a referendum. In the term of the previous government, the Irish people voted on six such referendums, on issues as diverse as the abolition of the upper house of parliament; the provision of same-sex marriage; and reduction in the pay of judges in line with other public servants.
This has not sated the desire for constitutional reform; Ireland’s new government has promised five referendums within its lifetime, with the possibly of several more besides.
In early May, after months of negotiations, a deal was formed to return Fine Gael – the major party in the previous coalition government – to power as a minority government. The result of these negotiations for the support of several independent TDs (MPs) and the acquiescence of main opposition party Fianna Fáil was a detailed Programme for Government, as well as memorandums of understanding between the major parties. These are designed to avoid political conflicts that would threaten the stability of the government. Only time will tell if they will succeed; recent disagreement between Fine Gael and independent cabinet ministers over a Private Members’ Bill on abortion raised doubts as to the lifespan of the government.
If the government lasts, however, we will see many constitutional referendums. The Programme for Government pledged referendums on four discrete subjects, to be held at some point during the government’s term: the constitutional crime of Blasphemy; the ‘women’s place in the home’ clause; the Unified Patent Court; and the constitutional standing of the Ceann Comhairle (the chairperson of the lower house of parliament).