A Constitution Unit project has been examining options for an English Parliament. One factor that must be taken into account is implications for the UK’s central political institutions. Focusing on the separately elected model for an English Parliament, in this post Jack Sheldon and Meg Russell suggest that there would inevitably be substantial implications. Both the UK government and parliament would need restructuring, and there would be pressures to move towards more formal federalism.
Since autumn 2016 we have been working on a research project exploring options for an English Parliament. Various earlier posts have covered some of our findings, and our detailed report will be published very shortly. In this post we summarise some of our conclusions on implications for the UK’s central political institutions, including the UK government and parliament. We suggest that, in contrast to the relatively modest changes at the centre that resulted from devolution to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, an English Parliament would require substantial institutional restructuring.
For the sake of simplicity we assume here that an English Parliament would mirror arrangements in the existing devolved areas – that is, a directly elected body to which an executive headed by a First Minister would be accountable. Our report will also consider the implications of the dual mandate model for an English Parliament, under which the English legislature would be composed of Westminster MPs for English seats. While some of the issues covered here do not apply to that model, our report discusses how it too would have major consequences for the centre.
A necessary starting point in considering implications of an English Parliament is the powers that would be retained at UK level. Policy powers and financial arrangements for an English Parliament were covered in a previous blog post; in summary, its policy powers would probably be similar to those of the devolved legislatures in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Given the design of UK devolution, with policy areas such as education and health almost entirely devolved, this means that the legislative competence of the UK parliament would reduce very substantially.Continue reading →
Yesterday the Scottish government published a detailed policy paper, setting out options for how Scotland could remain in the EU single market following Brexit. In this post Jim Gallagher argues that the paper, which focuses on options that would involve Scotland remaining part of the UK, suggests that Nicola Sturgeon would rather avoid a second independence referendum. The First Minister may instead be edging towards a confederal solution that the majority of Scots might sign up for.
The publication of the Scottish government’s policy paper on Brexit, Scotland’s Place in Europe, may signal something of a change in tone from the SNP leadership. Reading it, one can only conclude that last thing Nicola Sturgeon wants is an independence referendum.
Certainly Sturgeon’s tone contrasts with the noises off from Alex Salmond, who has been energetically laying the groundwork for a rerun of 2014, or some of Scottish government Brexit minister Mike Russell’s earlier rhetoric. It is still possible to conclude from the paper and the logic of the SNP’s argument that, if they don’t get the concessions they hope, then they will be demanding another independence referendum. But the big message from the paper and its presentation is not bullying language about when a referendum might be called: it is that the SNP don’t think leaving the EU justifies repeating the independence poll at all. Instead they are setting out ways the UK can leave the EU without one. Can the UK stay in or near the single market, or at least can Scotland? If it can the UK leaves the EU, but the SNP won’t find themselves demanding ‘indyref2’.
Responses from Unionists
Opponents of independence can respond in different ways. It’s easy enough to mock. Many, supporters and opponents alike, will say it’s fear. Maybe fear of losing – two-thirds of voters don’t want yet another poll, and independence support is where it was in 2014. Around 400,000 nationalists seem to dislike the EU as much as the UK and might not vote to leave the UK just to join the EU again. So despite what Alex Salmond says, the prospects of another referendum are not hopeful for the SNP and a second defeat would surely be fatal to the cause.
On the face of it Brexit appears likely to pull Scotland in a direction that it does not want to go. But could Brexit actually create the conditions for a solution that leaves most people happy enough, and does not leave the other side resentful? Jim Gallagher suggests that this is a possibility. The return of powers from Brussels not only to Whitehall, but also the devolved governments, presents an opportunity to move towards a confederal constitution that could satisfy the demands of people in all parts of the Union.
The absence of a coherent strategy for getting the UK out of Europe is becoming increasingly clear. Brexit is construed ever more narrowly as simply a bid for independence, a search for sovereignty (not parliamentary sovereignty, it seems, as parliament will have no say in triggering the negotiations leading to the UK’s departure). This tells us something about referendums as a decision-making device, and points to what a bad idea Brexit as a pretext for another Scottish independence referendum is. But, paradoxically, the government’s post-Brexit destination might just offer the chance of a more constructive resolution for Scottish-UK relations.
It is increasingly clear that Brexit was a nationalist referendum. Both sides would be insulted by the comparison, but Messrs Johnson and Gove spent the campaign singing the same tune as Alex Salmond. Both claimed to be positive, but were essentially negative. They were telling people to vote against a union – European or British. But voting against something is writing a blank cheque for something else. And if you write a blank cheque, somebody else fills it in.
In Whitehall today, the three Brexit ministers can’t agree how to fill that cheque in. That’s hardly surprising, since their pre-referendum promises were inconsistent: we are not going to get the single market without free movement of labour. This shows the first big problem with the referendum as a device. If people vote against something, there is no saying what they will get instead, and when the campaigners aren’t in a position to deliver their promises, the outcome will probably be something the population don’t actually want. Chances are, had it been offered them in terms, a majority of voters would have rejected the Brexit deal we are about to get.