Yesterday the Scottish government published a detailed policy paper, setting out options for how Scotland could remain in the EU single market following Brexit. In this post Jim Gallagher argues that the paper, which focuses on options that would involve Scotland remaining part of the UK, suggests that Nicola Sturgeon would rather avoid a second independence referendum. The First Minister may instead be edging towards a confederal solution that the majority of Scots might sign up for.
The publication of the Scottish government’s policy paper on Brexit, Scotland’s Place in Europe, may signal something of a change in tone from the SNP leadership. Reading it, one can only conclude that last thing Nicola Sturgeon wants is an independence referendum.
Certainly Sturgeon’s tone contrasts with the noises off from Alex Salmond, who has been energetically laying the groundwork for a rerun of 2014, or some of Scottish government Brexit minister Mike Russell’s earlier rhetoric. It is still possible to conclude from the paper and the logic of the SNP’s argument that, if they don’t get the concessions they hope, then they will be demanding another independence referendum. But the big message from the paper and its presentation is not bullying language about when a referendum might be called: it is that the SNP don’t think leaving the EU justifies repeating the independence poll at all. Instead they are setting out ways the UK can leave the EU without one. Can the UK stay in or near the single market, or at least can Scotland? If it can the UK leaves the EU, but the SNP won’t find themselves demanding ‘indyref2’.
Responses from Unionists
Opponents of independence can respond in different ways. It’s easy enough to mock. Many, supporters and opponents alike, will say it’s fear. Maybe fear of losing – two-thirds of voters don’t want yet another poll, and independence support is where it was in 2014. Around 400,000 nationalists seem to dislike the EU as much as the UK and might not vote to leave the UK just to join the EU again. So despite what Alex Salmond says, the prospects of another referendum are not hopeful for the SNP and a second defeat would surely be fatal to the cause.
Five months on from the EU referendum it is still unclear what sort of Brexit deal the UK government would like to seek. In this post Jim Gallagher argues that this means that it is hard to see either the UK or the EU being in a position to implement a bespoke Brexit arrangement by the deadline of March 2019. He therefore suggests that an interim EEA-style deal for the UK is the most likely outcome from the Article 50 process.
Fully five months after the vote we still have no idea what the United Kingdom government thinks Brexit means. That very fact tells us what Brexit will probably be like, and how it will be implemented.
Failing to plan
That there never was a plan for Brexit is now a commonplace. David Cameron expected to win the referendum, and planned accordingly. For reasons that are now obvious, the different Leave campaigners weren’t in the planning business either. Over the last five months, this has moved from unsurprising, to deeply alarming. It is now quite likely to determine what happens.
Why do we still have no idea what Brexit means? First the magnitude of the task: Europe and its laws are embedded to a greater or lesser degree in every aspect of our public life. It’s said that there are 500 or more projects ongoing in the civil service to disentangle that spaghetti. In the absence of clear direction as to the end-state, each is bound to have multiple variants. Ministers are unable to give a clear direction in part because they know they must negotiate. But the main reason is that they themselves have no single view on what the UK’s future EU relationship should be. They disagree on how far out we should be. It’s not just a lack of vision but competing visions, reflecting the continuing political divisions at the core of the government. It’s hardly surprising then that the civil service, now smaller than at any point since the Second World War, is having a hard time. Whitehall is crying out for a clear sense of direction and not getting one. As a result, the UK will trigger Article 50 on the basis of an incoherent and undeliverable prospectus.
On the face of it Brexit appears likely to pull Scotland in a direction that it does not want to go. But could Brexit actually create the conditions for a solution that leaves most people happy enough, and does not leave the other side resentful? Jim Gallagher suggests that this is a possibility. The return of powers from Brussels not only to Whitehall, but also the devolved governments, presents an opportunity to move towards a confederal constitution that could satisfy the demands of people in all parts of the Union.
The absence of a coherent strategy for getting the UK out of Europe is becoming increasingly clear. Brexit is construed ever more narrowly as simply a bid for independence, a search for sovereignty (not parliamentary sovereignty, it seems, as parliament will have no say in triggering the negotiations leading to the UK’s departure). This tells us something about referendums as a decision-making device, and points to what a bad idea Brexit as a pretext for another Scottish independence referendum is. But, paradoxically, the government’s post-Brexit destination might just offer the chance of a more constructive resolution for Scottish-UK relations.
It is increasingly clear that Brexit was a nationalist referendum. Both sides would be insulted by the comparison, but Messrs Johnson and Gove spent the campaign singing the same tune as Alex Salmond. Both claimed to be positive, but were essentially negative. They were telling people to vote against a union – European or British. But voting against something is writing a blank cheque for something else. And if you write a blank cheque, somebody else fills it in.
In Whitehall today, the three Brexit ministers can’t agree how to fill that cheque in. That’s hardly surprising, since their pre-referendum promises were inconsistent: we are not going to get the single market without free movement of labour. This shows the first big problem with the referendum as a device. If people vote against something, there is no saying what they will get instead, and when the campaigners aren’t in a position to deliver their promises, the outcome will probably be something the population don’t actually want. Chances are, had it been offered them in terms, a majority of voters would have rejected the Brexit deal we are about to get.
In a paper published this week by Nuffield College, Oxford Jim Gallagher argues that in responding to June’s Brexit vote the UK and Scottish governmentsmust proceed rationally, on the basis of the evidence, and pursue the national interest. They should not feel bound by the Leave campaign’s promises and should seek to stay in, or as close as possible to, the single market. The paper is summarised here.
In an attempt to unite the Tory party David Cameron has split the country. He has left the governments of the UK with a shambles to clear up. It is not at all easy to see a path through the rubble, but if governments focus on the things that really matter – the economy, the territorial integrity of the UK – then perhaps they will be able to discern a way forward.
The first thing they need to do is understand the nature of the vote. Just like the vote in the Scottish referendum, it was as much a cry of distress as a political statement. Like the Leave campaign, the Leave vote is more protest than proposal. Of course, there are those in the UK who are ideologically opposed to Europe, but what got leave over the line in the referendum were the votes of the politically alienated and economically distressed. The present setup, economic or constitutional, is not working for them, and they were led to believe (by a notably mendacious campaign) that leaving the EU would solve their problems. Those who thought things couldn’t get any worse for them were not put off by George Osborne’s warnings about risk.
In that sense voters are like students – they give the answer to the question they would have liked the examiner to ask. But in this referendum, it was the question setters who failed.
It has now been a year since the vote on Scottish independence. Jim Gallagher considers how divisions which emerged between yes and no voters during the campaign have persisted, and the challenges this creates. He argues that Scotland now faces a different set of choices–not what country to belong to, but what sort of country it really wants to be.
Zhou Enlai is said to have quipped that 200 years was too short a time to judge the effect of the French Revolution. 12 months certainly isn’t long enough to assess the legacy of the Scottish referendum.
It was certainly an extraordinary process. For two years, Scotland talked about nothing but Scotland, and an unprecedented number of people eventually cast their vote, one way or another.
Energy and Division
The debate was extraordinary, sometimes energising, but also deeply divisive. Not just because people took opposing views. Yes voters – rationally or not – were hopeful; they wanted things to change and independence represented change. Many no voters were fearful; they had not asked to make this choice, and feared disruptive change would be forced on them.
The campaigning was unprecedented: the intensity of an election, but lasting two years. The opposing campaigns talked incessantly about Scotland, but hardly engaged with each other. The Scottish government’s doorstop of a White Paper was a partisan, not a government, publication. The relentless positivity of the yes campaign spoke primarily to the heart. Questions of economics or policy choice were airly dismissed as irrelevant, or establishment bluff. Better Together’s head was more firmly screwed on, but it’s hard to make saying no, even ‘no thanks’, sound positive. The UK government’s publications argued a case, but without much pizzazz.
Jim Gallagher reflects on what the Scotland Bill tells us about the Scotland-UK relationship and devolution more broadly. He argues that the Bill presents a challenge to the unwritten constitution, and that now is the time to clarify and codify the territorial aspects to make a statement about how and why the Union hangs together.
The Scotland Bill calls to mind, irresistibly, the aphorism of Lampedusa: if things are to stay the same, they’ve got to change. If it is to sustain itself as a Union, the UK must become a new and different one. The Scotland Bill should be the catalyst for change, but this isn’t only about Scotland. It is about how the UK understands itself as a territorial state. Like Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland understand the UK as a voluntary association bound together by common interests and shared experience, in many ways like a federal country. But too many at the centre of the UK see a unitary state with some untidy territorial edges. In essence this understanding is based on a half-baked notion of parliamentary sovereignty. If the UK wants to stay together, this has to change.
The Scotland Bill makes the nature of Scotland-UK relationship more explicit, and implies similar things about Wales and Northern Ireland too. The UK is a multinational state, an association whose membership is voluntary, and that is now very explicit for both Northern Ireland and Scotland. Scotland has always had its own institutions, separate from the UK’s. For first three centuries after the union, these were Scottish, but undemocratic. For the last 15 years, Scottish institutions have been accountable through the Scottish Parliament. The Scotland Bill puts it beyond doubt that this is irreversible. Devolution is permanent, and the Scottish Parliament is master in its own house: its power is paramount in devolved matters, and it controls its own composition. That is the point of the constitutional provisions of the Bill: statements of the obvious if you like, but that will be true of many constitutions–if you know how the institutions work in practice, you will find the constitutional legislation almost banal.
Responding to Daniel Gover and Michael Kenny’s analysis of last week’s English votes for English laws proposals, Jim Gallagher argues that the really challenging issue that EVEL raises relates to taxes and public spending.
The analysis by Daniel Gover and Michael Kenny of the government’s proposals for English votes is helpful in setting out what these plans might mean for legislation. I agree with much of their analysis. These are plans at the aggressive, though perhaps not the most aggressive, end of the spectrum. But the really challenging issue they raise is not about laws, but about taxes and public spending.
Not the Barnett formula
This isn’t about the Barnett formula. The idea that Scottish MPs should vote on purely English legislation because it will affect Scottish spending through the Barnett formula is simply wrong. The government has made this even clearer than it already was by explicitly exempting the legislation which determines spending from the new process in its proposals. A lot of nonsense is being talked about this. Even though they might have spending consequences, Acts of Parliament do not of themselves affect budgets. Spending plans will still be voted on in legislative processes in which all MPs – Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish, as well as English – will have a vote. So the discovery by the SNP that they are now entitled to vote on English measures suggests they haven’t read the government’s plans.