Category Archives: Constitutions and constitution making

Why the UK should have a Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution

Posted on by

Last year, the Institute for Government and the Bennett Institute for Public Policy published a Review of the UK Constitution. One recommendation in that review was that parliament create a joint committee on the constitution. Steph Coulter sets out the case for such a body.

As part of our recently completed Review of the UK Constitution, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute for Public Policy outlined the key issues with the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and made recommendations for reform. We highlighted the lack of clarity within a system underpinned by an uncodified constitution and the failure of existing political checks to deter constitutional impropriety.

Given the UK system’s reliance on parliamentary sovereignty as its central constitutional principle, we believe that parliament should be central to addressing these issues. Therefore, one of our key recommendations was the establishment of a new Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, comprised of members from both the House of Commons and House of Lords. By acting as a central and authoritative constitutional guardian, such a body would go some way to improving constitutional clarity and would provide a more effective check on unconstitutional behaviour than existing arrangements.

Continue reading →

Unchecked power? How recent constitutional reforms are threatening UK democracy

Posted on by

The constitution has consistently felt under strain in recent years, following a succession of crises. Alison Young argues that a written constitution is not necessarily the solution to this problem, concluding that it is important to ensure that key constitutional guardrails are not just defended against abolition, but protected from gradual degradation as well.

Ever since the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, it seems like the UK constitution has lurched from crisis to crisis. Even after negotiating Brexit, the UK had to deal with a global pandemic – something, it would appear from hearings of the Covid-19 inquiry, for which the UK was not fully prepared.

With commentators naturally immersed in these key issues, there has been less attention paid to other, quieter, aspects of constitutional reform. The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2020, for example, appears to have barely registered with the general public. There is probably even less awareness of the changes to the oversight of the Electoral Commission provided for in the Elections Act 2022. Yet both reshaped the UK constitution.

Continue reading →

Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the courts and the rule of law

Posted on by

A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this fourth excerpt identifying potential changes relating to the courts and the rule of law.

Recent years have seen growing scrutiny of the relationship between government, parliament and the courts, and the government’s attitude to the rule of law. Politicians have increasingly tended to push back against courts – which are said to have become too powerful in our constitutional arrangements, leading to a ‘democratic deficit’. Resistance to the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights seems to have evolved into a more general willingness to breach, or risk breaching, international law. Added to this have been disagreements over the appropriate bounds of legal scrutiny, with the government’s increasing use of ouster clauses – which exempt certain decisions from judicial review – attracting particular attention. And legal funding and administrative challenges continue to fuel expert concerns about access to justice. In this climate, the role of the government’s law officers, such as the Attorney General, in upholding the rule of law has come under increasing attention. These tensions have boiled over at times into very public attacks by ministers on judges and lawyers.

This is an area in which there could be significant ‘quick wins’ through communicating a change of attitude. Beyond this, various proposals for change have come from external expert bodies and parliamentary committees for improvements to the system. Such reforms – some of them quite minor – could help to settle the relationship between the political branches and the courts. This would help uphold the UK’s reputation as a bastion of the rule of law – with all the international political and economic advantages that confers. There are also proposals for wider-reaching policy change.

Continue reading →

Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: parliament

Posted on by

A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this second excerpt identifying potential changes to parliament.

Recent years have seen significant tensions over the role of parliament, which came under particular pressure over Brexit and Covid. There have been concerns about declining standards of scrutiny, and parliament has yet to adapt fully to the new policy environment post-Brexit. There are long-standing concerns about the House of Lords, including over its size and the nature of prime ministerial appointments. Reforms could be very beneficial, to improve governmental accountability, to avoid the government advancing poorly thought-through policy, and thereby to build trust in political decision-making.

Numerous proposals have been made for change, both by external experts and by parliamentary committees. There are some long-running concerns which could be resolved quickly and easily by ministers as ‘quick wins’. Various other changes would necessarily require a little more time and consideration. Some of these are naturally subject to government initiative (e.g. legislation), but various others are formally within the purview of parliament itself and would be dependent, for example, on reviews by parliamentary committees. These would nonetheless greatly benefit from cooperation by the government. Large-scale House of Lords reform is the most obvious proposal which is more disputed, and would require further work – and potentially significant consultation and deliberation – before being ready to be implemented.

Continue reading →

Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the executive

Posted on by

A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this first excerpt identifying potential changes to the executive branch.

In recent years there have been significant concerns about the functioning of central government, including but not confined to ethical standards. Perennial tensions in the relationship between ministers and the civil service have been exacerbated by the political stresses of the Brexit process and the Covid pandemic, culminating in some politicians’ attacks on the civil service, and some high-profile removals of permanent secretaries under the Johnson and Truss premierships. Since becoming Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak has repeatedly missed opportunities to match his actions to his widely welcomed assertion on the steps of Downing Street that he wanted to lead a government of ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’. Various episodes have also raised questions about whether the UK’s standards regulators have the status and powers required adequately to perform their roles.

Yet public opinion research by the Constitution Unit shows that people give great emphasis to the importance of honesty and integrity in their politicians, and want independent regulatory mechanisms that punish bad behaviour. Reforms in these areas could help both to increase public trust in politics and promote good governance. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), parliamentary committees and external experts have made various recommendations for specific changes. While these are partly targeted at stabilising the situation, experts also agree that there is scope to go further to strengthen constitutional regulators, and to clarify the role, duties and accountability of the civil service. Some changes in this area lie squarely in the government’s power and could be quickly and easily implemented. Some others would require legislation, or benefit from wider consultation. There are also some larger questions which remain more controversial.

Quick wins

  • The Prime Minister should commit to treating civil servants and constitutional regulators with respect and avoiding negative public briefing against them, requiring members of the Cabinet and governing party to abide by the same principle. Impartial civil servants and other independent officials serve the public interest, and can rarely answer back. They should not be beyond constructive criticism, but undermining confidence in them risks damaging trust in the political system as a whole.
  • The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests should be given the power to open his or her own investigations into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code, and publish their findings, without requiring the Prime Minister’s authorisation to do so. This has been recommended by CSPL and numerous other bodies.
  • The UK’s other constitutional regulators should be strengthened. Partly this is a matter of legislation (discussed below) but some improvements could be made purely by ministers. For example, the recruitment processes for the heads of key watchdogs should require a majority of fully independent members on the appointments panel to minimise partisan influence over the appointment of ethical regulators.
  • Another matter that lies in the Prime Minister’s power would be to reduce ministerial turnover (‘churn’) – which has long been identified as a challenge to effective policymaking. The results would not be seen immediately, but a commitment to this principle would be welcome.
Continue reading →