An inquiry into inquiries: why the House of Lords has established a Statutory Inquiries Committee

As the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry and the Covid-19 inquiry continue their work, Philip Norton explains how public inquiries can operate very differently, depending on how they are established. He discusses the numerous ways inquiries can operate, analyses post-legislative scrutiny of the relevant legislation, and outlines the aims of a new parliamentary inquiry on the subject, which he chairs.

Recent years have seen some notable disasters and scandals, including the Manchester Arena bombings, the Grenfell Tower fire, the miscarriage of justice in the Post Office Horizon IT scandal, the use of infected blood, and child sexual abuse. Whenever they occur, there is a natural desire to identify what went wrong and what can be done to prevent a reoccurrence. These tasks are typically vested in a public inquiry. Such inquiries have become a significant feature of public life. 

Setting up public inquiries is not a new activity. However, as a study by the Institute for Government has shown, public inquiries have become more numerous. Prior to the enactment of the Inquiries Act 2005, there were different statutory bases for inquiries. The principal one was the Tribunals and Inquiries (Evidence) Act 1921. It was regarded as cumbersome, requiring both Houses of Parliament to approve a Secretary of State establishing an inquiry with the same powers as the High Court. When inquiries were established, they tended to be lengthy and expensive.   

As the government’s figures show, not all public inquiries are established by statute. Ministers have the option of setting up an inquiry on a non-statutory basis. These tend to be favoured for reasons of time and cost. A non-statutory inquiry can be conducted relatively quickly. However, public pressure often leads to the creation of a statutory inquiry or a non-statutory inquiry being converted into a statutory one. Statutory inquiries have the advantage of being empowered to summon witnesses and take evidence under oath. Despite the Act imposing a duty on chairs to consider financial cost, they can still be expensive as well as lengthy, sometimes costing millions of pounds and sitting for years. Although ministers may be critical of this, the public tend to favour the statutory over the non-statutory. A survey carried out by Crest Advisory found that 75% of those questioned felt that an inquiry should investigate the event or events as thoroughly as possible even if this means the inquiry taking longer or costing more than was originally anticipated. 

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Setting up the COVID-19 inquiry: an expert view

The inquiry into the COVID-19 pandemic is due to start work in the spring, chaired by Baroness (Heather) Hallett, a former Court of Appeal judge. It will be one of the most complex inquiries in legal history, and highly charged politically, with over 150,000 deaths so far, and the pandemic far from over. In January, the UCL Political Science Department hosted an expert panel discussion to pool advice on how best to set up a complex inquiry to ensure that it works speedily and efficiently, victims feel they have been heard, and the findings are accepted as legitimate. Ioana Măxineanu summarises their contributions.

On January 13th, the UCL Political Science Department hosted an online seminar entitled Setting Up the Covid Inquiry. The event was chaired by Robert Hazell, and brought together three distinguished panellists previously involved in high profile inquiries: Lord (Nicholas) Phillips, chair of the BSE Inquiry (1998-2000); Margaret Aldred, secretary of the Iraq Inquiry (2009-2016); and Brian Leveson, chair of the inquiry into press regulation (2011-2012).

This post summarises the initial contributions of the three speakers. The full event, including a very informative and interesting Q&A, is available on the Political Science Department’s YouTube page.

Lord Phillips

Lord Phillips started by explaining the background of the BSE Inquiry. In 1986, the first case of BSE (mad cow disease) was identified in England. The disease deforms the proteins in the brain, and is inevitably fatal. The Conservative government appointed an expert committee to advise on the possibility of humans contracting the disease. The committee concluded that the risk was remote, a view the government passed on to the public. Unfortunately, that was wrong. In 1995, the first death of a man who contracted the human equivalent, Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease, was identified. Many felt misled by the previous guidance.

In late 1997, a non-statutory public inquiry was set up by the incoming Labour government. Lord Phillips was provided with two assessors: June Bridgeman, a retired senior civil servant, and Professor Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, a geneticist. They were full members of the tribunal, so they could write appropriate sections of the report. Paul Walker, a barrister in Lord Phillips’ chambers, was appointed as counsel to the tribunal.

The inquiry’s terms of reference required Lord Phillips to report within a year, which he had to extend twice. In the end, the Inquiry took nearly three years. It looked at 10 years of government activity, with a huge amount of documents. A large team of young people, many of them students, was recruited to help digest the documents.

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