Robert Hazell summarises the process of government formation that will begin tomorrow.
By Friday morning we should know most of the election results. Assuming the polls are proved correct, with Labour and the Conservatives each having around 270 to 280 seats, and both well short of a majority, what happens next? Answer: this is not a political or constitutional crisis. The parties will negotiate to work out who can command confidence in the new Parliament. That will be formally established in the vote on the Queen’s Speech in 3-4 weeks’ time. In the meantime the Cameron government remains in office as a caretaker government.
Who governs in the meantime?
If Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats choose to resign (because they have done badly, or to strengthen their negotiating position) Cameron still remains in office as Prime Minister. He may leave the Lib Dem positions vacant, or fill just a few in case of emergencies (e.g. Energy Secretary). The incumbent government will be able to respond to any emergencies at home or abroad, but otherwise is limited in the decisions it can make. Ministers remain in office, even if they have lost their seats. Under the caretaker convention, the government will try to avoid taking any decisions which might bind the hands of a future government. This means that it should not embark on any new policy, let any major government contracts, or make any senior public appointments. If these are unavoidable, it should consult first with the opposition parties: as Alistair Darling did before going to the ECOFIN meeting on 9 May 2010 to discuss the first Greek bailout.
On 15 April 2015, Professor Robert Hazell, Director of the Constitution Unit, and Peter Riddell, Director of the Institute for Government, spoke at a Constitution Unit seminar entitled ‘Coalition or Minority Government in May?’ Juliet Wells comments on the event.
With a fortnight remaining before polling day, and national polls steadfastly suggesting that neither of the two principal political parties will now succeed in achieving a ‘lift-off’ in popularity, the prospect of another hung parliament looms large. It is a possibility with which pre-election commentary has increasingly been preoccupied: as Jonathan Freedland has noted, ‘the focus is not on the parties so much as the likely ruling blocs’. Against this background, Robert Hazell and Peter Riddell’s seminar on government formation after May 7 shone a welcome light onto the processes by which the ultimate ‘ruling bloc’ might come to be.
From this perspective the utility of the seminar was threefold: first, it represented an opportunity to debunk some commonplace misunderstandings about the consequences, in practical and constitutional terms, of a hung parliament; second, it provided a comparative overview of experiences in forming minority and coalition governments, both within the UK and abroad, and highlighted in particular the likely differences between 2010 and 2015; and third, it touched upon the possible deeper implications for British democracy of yet another equivocal general election result.
Robert Hazell weighs up options for establishing who can command the confidence of the House of Commons, which will be particularly significant in the likely event of another coalition. This is the fourth in a series of posts about government formation after the election.
The Cabinet Manual explains the rules as follows:
‘… the Sovereign will invite the person who appears most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House [of Commons] to serve as Prime Minister and to form a government’ (para 2.8)
In a hung parliament that appears to require the Queen to play a guessing game. But the Cabinet Manual goes on to say:
‘Where a range of different administrations could potentially be formed, political parties may wish to hold discussions to establish who is best able to command the confidence of the House of Commons and should form the next government. The Sovereign would not expect to become involved…’ (para 2.13).
In the second of a short series of posts about government formation after the election, Robert Hazell discusses the weaknesses of the Cabinet Manual in terms of offering guidance on role of the incumbent PM and the caretaker convention.
On 23 February I gave evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee for their inquiry into government formation after the election. We discussed the inadequacy of the guidance in the Cabinet Manual about two things:
- Whether there is a duty on the incumbent Prime Minister to remain in office until it is clear who can command confidence in the new Parliament
- The caretaker convention, which requires a caretaker government to avoid actions or decisions which would bind the hands of a future government.
Duty on incumbent Prime Minister to remain in office
The draft Cabinet Manual published in December 2010 stated:
‘The incumbent Prime Minister is not expected to resign until it is clear that there is someone else who should be asked to form a government because they are better placed to command the confidence of the House of Commons and that information has been communicated to the Sovereign.’