The election of the Speaker: myth and reality

When the newly elected House of Commons meets on Tuesday, its first task will be the election of the Speaker. In this post, Andrew Kennon explains how this will work and separates some of the myths surrounding the process from reality.

When the newly elected House of Commons meets for the first time on Tuesday, the first business – even before swearing in all MPs – will be election of the Speaker. John Bercow, who won his Buckingham seat with a majority of over 25,000 on Thursday, is expected to be re-elected unopposed, though prior to the election there was some talk of a challenge. What are the myths and realities surrounding this process?

Is the Speaker always re-elected unopposed?

This is what has happened in practice. Every Speaker who has been re-elected to the House – normally with other parties not putting up rival candidates in the constituency – has been re-elected to that post. But the House is given the opportunity to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Only if the answer is ‘no’ does it proceed to a full election.

The possibility of rejecting the incumbent has been raised in the media under Speaker Bercow. He was first elected in 2009, about a year before the 2010 general election. At that point, he was a Conservative MP on the opposition side of it he House. There was some speculation after the 2010 election that the new Conservative government would oppose his re-election, but this did not materialise. The same occurred after the 2015 election.

So: this is practice but not binding.

Does a new Speaker always comes from the Government side of the House?

This is what happened in practice until 1992 when Betty Boothroyd was elected. There is no reason to regard it as a convention.

Does the Speakership alternate between the two main parties?

Since Speaker Martin (Labour) succeeded Speaker Boothroyd (also formerly Labour) in 2000 this cannot be said to be a firm rule. Between 1965 and 1992 successive Speakers did come from the opposite side of the House to their predecessor – but, equally, they also came from the party in government at the time of their election. The House’s freedom to make its own choice among an array of volunteers probably means that any sense of it being the ‘turn’ of a particular party is out of date.

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Managing the new parliament: some challenges for Theresa May’s minority government

The unexpected election result leaves the Conservatives seeking to establish a minority government, with support from the Democratic Unionist Party’s ten MPs. With fewer than half the seats in the House of Commons, and barely more than half when adding the DUP, Theresa May’s new government will face many additional challenges in parliament. Meg Russell explores some of the clearest examples.

Following weeks of speculation about the general election result, few were contemplating the prospect of a minority government led by Theresa May. The Prime Minister proposed the election in the clear expectation of an increased House of Commons majority, citing (in a rather exaggerated manner) difficulties in parliament. Instead she now doesn’t have a majority at all. With one seat still to declare, the Conservatives are on 318 in a 650-number House. Combined others (excluding seven Sinn Féin, who do not take their seats), have 324. May’s government is hence liable to be outnumbered without relying on the support of the 10 DUP members, with whom she has opened talks.

The Prime Minister’s initial statement gave little detail of the form that the relationship with the DUP is likely to take, but it is assumed that she will seek a single-party minority government rather than a formal coalition. The Constitution Unit’s December 2009 report Making Minority Government Work suddenly looks like essential reading, for politicians and politics-watchers alike. As it sets out, there are various options in a situation where a government lacks a single-party majority. One is a formal ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement, whereby another party (or parties) pledge to support the governing party (or parties) in confidence votes and on essential funding decisions; another is for the government to simply negotiate support for policies on a case-by-case basis. A coalition is the most formalised arrangement, with both parties signed up to a programme and liable to both have ministers in the government.

Our report emphasised (as repeated more recently on this blog by one of its authors) that minority governments are not unusual in other democracies, and can be relatively stable. Nonetheless, particularly in the UK context where majority governments are the norm, such an arrangement will present a number of fresh (or enhanced) challenges for the government in managing its relationship with parliament. These may affect all kinds of areas of policy; but the Prime Minister will be perhaps most troubled about their impact on the Brexit process.

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2017 candidate selection: what might the new Conservative intake look like?

Although the polls have tightened, the Conservatives are still widely expected to win a majority in tomorrow’s general election. Oliver Chan looks ahead to what the new intake of Conservative MPs might look like in terms of career background, education, diversity and the extent to which they have pre-existing links to their constituencies. Focusing on Conservative candidates selected in safe retirement seats and 30 non-held marginals, he finds marked differences in the profile of candidates selected.

Despite the tightening of the polls in recent weeks, the Conservatives are still widely expected to win a majority at the general election. A victory would see a batch of newly-minted MPs elected, some of whom will go on to climb the Westminster ladder to the highest echelons of political power.

This post looks at some of the potential members of the new Conservative intake according to a number of demographic and background factors – namely career, education, local versus non-local candidates and diversity (gender, BME and LGBTI status). Candidate background information has been gathered from multiple sources including ConservativeHome, Iain Dale, candidate webpages, Facebook and LinkedIn accounts where applicable and local and national newspaper coverage. This analysis covers the candidates from the 12 seats held by the Conservatives where the incumbent has retired (‘retirement seats’) and the top 30 opposition-held targets in terms of required swing (excluding Copeland, which was gained by the Conservatives in a by-election in February).

This approach allows us to examine the social background of a sample of the potential new Conservative intake, but also offers a valuable opportunity to compare candidates selected for safe seats and opposition-held marginal seats. Of course, this does not suggest that the Conservatives will necessarily gain all of these seats, or indeed that they will not gain other seats that require larger swings, but the analysis provides an early view of what the new Conservative intake might look like, and how candidates selected in safe seats compare to those selected for targets.

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What happens if the election really does produce a hung parliament?

A hung parliament is a possible – if still unlikely – outcome of the election on Thursday. Akash Paun discusses what would happen next if no one party has an overall majority once the results have declared. He explains that in the UK system ultimately who forms a government is determined by who is best placed to command the confidence of the House of Commons. 

The recent and dramatic shift in the polls makes a hung parliament a plausible, if still unlikely, outcome on Thursday. Westminster has little recent experience of inconclusive elections – just two since the war, in 1974 and 2010. A second hung parliament in seven years would make things interesting, but it would be no crisis.

The sky won’t fall in

A hung parliament might produce a period of uncertainty about the composition of the new administration. The UK is accustomed to a government being formed immediately, but the sky will not fall in if it takes a little longer for the situation to resolve itself. In 2010, it took five days before the handover from Gordon Brown to David Cameron.

The UK is very odd in its haste to form a new government within 24 hours of the polls closing. Fellow Westminster systems like Canada and Australia wait over a week before swearing in the Prime Minister, even when he or she has won a clear majority.

With Brexit talks due to start on 19 June, weeks of coalition negotiations – as in Germany, for example – would be unhelpful. But that is highly unlikely. If it takes a few days to clarify who is best placed to form a stable administration, then that time should be taken. And if the media can restrain itself from hyperbole about political or constitutional crisis, then all the better.

We have argued for greater clarity about the government formation process, but there are some established principles. So long as it is unclear who is to be Prime Minister, the existing government remains in office, subject to similar constraints as in the pre-election ‘purdah’ period. It is the duty of an outgoing prime minister to hold on until unequivocal advice can be given to the Queen about who should be the next guest for tea at the palace.

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Blueprint for a Constitutional Convention

In a new report published today, Alan Renwick and Robert Hazell examine options for the design of a constitutional convention in the UK. The report identifies and examines twelve key design features that need to be decided. These are summarised here.

 

Proposals for a UK constitutional convention are made by several parties in their 2017 election manifestos and have been prominent on the political agenda ever since the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Such proposals are intended to address both widespread disillusionment with the state of democracy and deep constitutional challenges, such as those posed by Brexit and uncertainty over the future of the Union. But there has as yet been little detailed thinking about the form that a constitutional convention should take. In our new report, we seek to fill that gap. We examine the issues, explore the lessons to be learned from constitutional conventions elsewhere, and identify the pitfalls to be avoided.

Most supporters of a constitutional convention argue that it should not be a commission of the ‘great and the good’ and nor should it be composed solely of politicians. Such approaches may have been viable in the past, but expectations for democracy have moved on and more direct forms of citizen engagement are now widely advocated. Where fundamental questions about the country’s future form and direction are at stake, the voices of members of the public should be clearly heard. This attracts many to the citizens’ assembly model of a constitutional convention.

A citizens’ assembly is a body of citizens who are selected at random from the population at large. Stratification is used to ensure that, so far as possible, the assembly’s membership reflects the diversity of the population in terms of criteria such as gender, age, and place of residence.  The assembly meets over multiple weekends. First, the members learn about the options that are available and get the chance to quiz experts and discuss initial ideas among themselves. Then they hear from advocates of a wide variety of views – from politicians, campaigners, and members of the public who wish to be heard. Finally, they reflect on all they have heard, deliberate in depth among themselves, and agree conclusions. Those conclusions are written up in a report, which is submitted to government and parliament.

Citizens’ assemblies were first held around a dozen years ago in British Columbia, Ontario, and the Netherlands. The most recent official assembly of this kind is working at present in Ireland: it agreed proposals for the liberalisation of Ireland’s highly restrictive abortion rules in April and it will shortly move on to consider a number of other issues.

There is clear evidence that such assemblies work well: the quality of members’ engagement is very high and they can develop conclusions that are reasoned and coherent.  At least in Ireland, they have also done much to encourage wider public debate and shape decision-making.

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The 2017 election manifestos and the constitution

Over the past two weeks the political parties have published their manifestos for the snap general election. In this post Chris Caden and Fionnuala Ní Mhuilleoir summarise the constitutional content, covering proposals relating to Brexit, the possibility of a constitutional convention, devolution, House of Lords reform, electoral reform, human rights and freedom of information.

Theresa May’s surprise election announcement left the political parties with the challenge of putting together manifestos in a matter of weeks. The Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Green Party and Plaid Cymru all published their manifestos in the week beginning 15 May. UKIP followed on 25 May and the SNP on 30 May. With much of the election debate centring on whom the public trust to lead the country through the biggest constitutional upheaval in recent history, Brexit is unsurprisingly covered by all the parties. Attention on other constitutional issues has wavered somewhat as a result, but Labour and the Liberal Democrats both propose a constitutional convention to review aspects of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. The manifestos also lay out a variety of options in areas such as House of Lords reform, devolution, electoral reform and human rights.

Brexit

Negotiating Brexit is a major theme for all parties. The Conservative Brexit commitments include ending membership of the single market and customs union so that a greater distinction between ‘domestic and international affairs in matters of migration, national security and the economy’ can be made. This means negotiating a free trade and customs agreement between the UK and EU member states and securing new trade agreements with other countries. Theresa May’s party aims for a ‘deep and special partnership’ with member states. A successful Brexit deal would entail regaining control of borders, reducing and controlling net migration, but maintaining a ‘frictionless’ Common Travel Area for people, goods and services to pass between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The manifesto controversially maintains that ‘no deal’ is better than a bad deal for the UK.

Labour also accepts the referendum result, but rejects ‘no deal’ as a feasible option and envisages something more akin to a ‘soft Brexit’. The party would scrap the Conservatives’ Brexit white paper and replace it with an agreement maintaining the benefits of the single market and customs union; the government’s proposed ‘Great Repeal Bill’ would be replaced with an EU Rights and Protections Bill to ensure no changes to workers’ and consumers’ rights, equality law or environmental protections. The party pledges to immediately guarantee existing rights for all EU nationals in the UK and UK citizens in EU countries, and would also seek to remain part of various research and educational projects such as Horizon 2020, Erasmus and the European Medicines Agency. Additionally, membership of organisations like Eurojust and Europol would be retained. Labour commits to no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Unlike the Conservatives and Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Greens pledge a second referendum after a Brexit agreement is concluded, which in each case would include an option on the ballot paper of staying in the EU. Preventing a hard Brexit is the first priority for the Lib Dems and as a result the party promises to fight for the continuation of UK membership of the single market and customs union. It also pledges to protect the rights of EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens abroad, to maintain UK participation in the Erasmus+ programme and other EU-funded schemes, and to retain the European Health Insurance Card. The Greens set out a similar agenda.

The SNP wishes to mitigate what they see as the damage of Brexit with the proposal that Scotland should remain in the single market. The party seeks additional powers for the Scottish government including powers that will be repatriated from Brussels to the UK like agriculture, fisheries, environmental protection and employment law. Plaid Cymru, meanwhile, pledges to make sure ‘every penny’ of European funding for Wales is replaced by the UK government and that the Welsh share of the money promised by the Leave campaign (referring to the £350 million for the NHS) is delivered. It also demands that the UK government seeks the endorsement of each UK devolved legislature before any trade deal can be signed.

UKIP supports leaving the single market, the customs union and the European Court of Justice. The manifesto outlines that no ‘divorce’ bill should be paid to the EU and that Brexit negotiations will be complete by the end of 2019.

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Re-assessing the (not so) Fixed-term Parliaments Act

On Monday 22 May the Constitution Unit hosted a debate on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. Against the backdrop of an early general election and a Conservative manifesto promise to scrap the Act, Carl Gardner and Professor Gavin Phillipson (Durham) argued the merits of the Act and the potential legal implications of its repeal. Kasim Khorasanee reports.

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was enacted under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government to regulate when general elections were held. Previously general elections were required at least every five years but their exact timing was a matter of royal prerogative, in practice exercised by the Prime Minister. The Act fixed the length of each session of the House of Commons, unless an early general election could be called. The Act set out two mechanisms to call an early general election. The first – which was relied upon to call the 2017 general election – required at least two thirds of the Commons (434 MPs) to vote in favour of an early general election. The second was triggered if a no confidence motion was passed by the Commons and not reversed within 14 days.

Carl Gardner

Carl Gardner, a former government lawyer, led the defence of the status quo ante. He began by highlighting the risks in allowing politicians the freedom to redraw constitutional rules – both in terms of unintended consequences and selfish intent. The Act was a key case in point. Nick Clegg, as Deputy Prime Minister, had made the case for the Act by suggesting fixed terms would bring greater stability to the political system and allow politicians to focus on governing by removing the distracting uncertainty around election timings. In practice the intense speculation over whether Theresa May would call a general election in late 2016, followed by her surprise announcement to do so in mid-2017, had demonstrated the flaws in Clegg’s arguments. Gardner drew attention to David Laws’ book 22 Days in May which underlined the fact that the Act had been drawn up as a calculated political compromise designed to stabilise the coalition government in power.

Gardner went on to argue that the British constitution’s complexity and nuance had been underestimated by reformists. He noted that the Prime Minister had never been able to call elections ‘on demand’, they had always required the monarch’s explicit authorisation to do so. Furthermore there had never been popular discontent at the calling of elections or any suggestion of Prime Ministers ‘abusing’ their powers in doing so. The Act had also introduced uncertainty with respect to no confidence motions. Firstly, it was unclear whether in the 14 days after a statutory no-confidence motion the Prime Minister would be under a duty to resign, or whether they would be free to work to reverse the motion. Secondly, votes which previously might have been understood as matters of confidence – budgets, the Queen’s speech, going to war – appeared to have been stripped of this effect. Whereas Tony Blair understood losing the 2003 Iraq War vote would have meant resigning, David Cameron happily carried on after losing the 2013 Syria intervention vote. Gardner suggested that the duty for Prime Ministers to resign once they had lost the confidence of the Commons had been eroded by the Act.

Finally, on the legality of repealing the Act, Gardner asserted that where common law or prerogative powers were overridden by statute, revoking the statute would have the effect of ‘reviving’ the previous common law or prerogative. In support of this he cited the High Court decision in the famous GCHQ Case (R v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex parte Council of Civil Service Unions and another [1984] IRLR 309 [73]). Although legislation such as Section 16(1) of the Interpretation Act 1978 appeared designed to prevent this reviving effect, it could be overridden by a clear expression of parliament’s will.

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