Conor J. Kelly and Etain Tannam discuss the new Irish coalition’s programme for government and what it means for UK-Irish relations. They conclude that while the disagreements between London and Dublin that characterised the Brexit period are dissipating and political relationships have noticeably improved in recent years, several challenges remain which will require strict adherence to the structures of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.  

A new set of Irish government ministers have received their seals of office in Dublin. The new coalition is a continuation of the historic partnership between the traditionally dominant parties of Irish politics Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, joined this time by independents. While it is unlikely the UK Labour government would have had strong preferences as to the outcome of the Irish coalition talks, they will be pleased with the continuity and stability the new government brings. 

The election of the Labour government under Keir Starmer in the UK also led to expectations of a ‘reset’ in the British-Irish relationship. Both Starmer and the then Taoiseach, Simon Harris, made warm speeches about revitalising the British-Irish relationship after the UK’s election in July. Their joint statement referred to the Irish government’s role as a ‘co-guarantor’ of the Agreement. The leaders also announced that annual prime ministerial summit meetings would occur from 2025. Since then, Harris has become Minister for Foreign Affairs in the new Irish government and met the new Northern Ireland Secretary, Hilary Benn, quickly after government formation, again reiterating the strength of the relationship.  

All of this has resulted in a noticeable sense of relief on both islands after the unpredictable Brexit years, which heralded a sharp decline in British-Irish cooperation. The referendum campaign in 2016 often failed to properly consider Brexit’s impact on Northern Ireland, or the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, despite the fact that EU membership was an assumed and arguably explicit framework for the 1998 Agreement. Although Brexit’s damage could have been minimised by regular British-Irish consultation and joint strategising through the 1998 Agreement’s British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (B-IIGC), such consultation did not occur. The EU’s task force prohibited direct British-Irish bilateralism, as it responded to the UK government’s behaviour, pursuing a hard Brexit, and minimising the Irish government’s role in Northern Ireland’s politics. The Irish government in response engaged in inflamed rhetoric, particularly from 2016 to 2018, which did not ‘dial down’ tensions.  The then opposition leader in Ireland, Micheál Martin, criticised the Irish government for some of its ‘megaphone’ rhetoric, saying that it ‘got unionists’ backs up’.  Later, the Protocol on Northern Ireland/Ireland  imposed a trade border between Britain and Northern Ireland, which, although argued to be unavoidable, greatly angered unionists. Initially, the governments did not meet to seek to assuage these tensions, as they had in previous decades. Under Rishi Sunak’s government, this issue was eventually addressed via the Windsor Framework in 2023 and the ‘Safeguarding the Union’ deal with the DUP in 2024. 

It is clear that even apart from its approach to Brexit, many unilateral acts by the British government from 2016 to 2022 also undermined the 1998 Agreement’s provision for an Irish government role in Northern Ireland and severely damaged trust. For example, the UK government’s announcement of the Legacy and Reconciliation Bill reversed an intergovernmental and multi-party agreement reached in 2014. Despite complaints from all the main parties in Northern Ireland and the Irish government that the bill would grant immunity to all past perpetrators of violence during the conflict, it was enacted in May 2024. In response, the Irish government, in stark contrast to its past approach and causing some surprise even in Ireland, took a case against the Legacy Act to the European Court of Human Rights.  

Therefore, it is not surprising that the election of the new governments has been met with sighs of relief. The programme for government agreed in Dublin says very little that would cause division and emphasises friendship. As regards the relationship with London, the new government promises continued cooperation on the implementation of the Windsor Framework and pledges to host ‘annual summits between the two Heads of Government, providing a platform to review joint efforts and deepen co-operation’. On legacy issues, Dublin promises to ‘work with victims’ groups, political parties and the British Government to develop a fit-for-purpose mechanism to seek truth and justice for victims and their families’ but does not provide much by way of specifics. As regards Northern Ireland, it touts the last Irish government’s successes in increasing spending on new cross-border initiatives via the Shared Island Unit created in 2020, and commits to spending an additional 1 billion euros on cross-border projects by 2035.  

Strangely absent, and in contrast to the government’s 2020 programme, are explicit references to the strand 2 and strand 3 institutions of the 1998 Agreement, which bring together senior government ministers across the island of Ireland and between Ireland and the UK respectively. Indeed, these institutions are mentioned only once and only to specify their composition. As we have previously argued, informal summits and gatherings by British and Irish politicians are welcome, but they cannot be a replacement for the kinds of institutionalised, formalised, and regular cooperation explicitly set out in the 1998 Agreement. Therefore, the vagueness of the references to the 1998 Agreement, although perhaps reflecting rushed preparation of the programme, is a worrying development.  

The B-IIGC established by the 1998 Agreement is meeting more regularly, after its long hiatus from 2007 to 2018. However, there appears to be no appetite to use it creatively, as was envisaged by the 1998 Agreement’s key architect, John Hume. The 1998 Agreement empowers the Northern Ireland Executive to be consulted by the B-IIGC on ‘non-devolved matters’ and calls for ‘regular’ meetings of the conference. Discussions between the governments about Northern Ireland are seen to be its core purpose, but the Agreement also says the conference can ‘promote bilateral co-operation at all levels on all matters of mutual interest’. However, Brexit was never seriously discussed on the B-IIGC, and even with the recent uptick of meetings, the agenda is still a timid one. Similarly, the 1998 Agreement says the B-IIGC ‘will keep under review the workings of the new British-Irish Agreement and the machinery and institutions established under it, including a formal published review three years after the Agreement comes into effect’. That review has yet to happen 27 years on.  

In contrast to Hume’s emphasis on formalised intergovernmental cooperation enshrined by an international treaty (akin to the EU), annual summits are ad hoc and rely on the good will of the governments at particular moments. For example, the annual summit system set up under the then prime ministers David Cameron and Enda Kenny in 2012 to manage the relationship had little impact and collapsed in the face of Brexit tensions. Even before Brexit, British-Irish behaviour to Northern Ireland was criticised for being reactive, rather than proactive. Initiatives outside the 1998 Agreement, such as the aforementioned Shared Island Unit and the annual summit system could contribute to atrophy of the essential pillars of the 1998 Agreement, particularly, if the governments do not inject more creativity and dynamism.  

Nor can it be assumed that the future of British-Irish relations under the current governments is rose-tinted. British and Irish governments, no matter how reconciling, will always have some conflicts of interest and perspectives. For example, the Irish government has not dropped its Legacy Act case, despite the Labour government quickly beginning a process of amendment. In addition, the UK’s exit from the EU implies that there are fewer common interests between the governments – both were previously close allies on many matters in EU debates. Moreover, there are fewer opportunities to communicate and engage in ‘corridor politics’ since Brexit. Finally, if there is a referendum on a united Ireland, which some academics predict in the coming decade, differences in interpretations of the rules governing a referendum (laid out in the 1998 Agreement) could become marked and deeply problematic. Indeed, recent polling suggests people from both communities in Northern Ireland and voters in the Republic think the B-IIGC could be a useful venue for continued UK-Irish cooperation after unification, were that to occur.  

Summits may not be sufficient to resolve future divisions, and it is unlikely that they would survive a large crisis. Therefore, while the ‘reset’ in British-Irish relations is very welcome, there are potential clouds on the horizon that necessitate a long term British-Irish strategy forged within the 1998 Agreement’s institutions, not reactive crisis management or informal relationship building alone. 

About the authors 

Dr Conor J. Kelly is the Bingham Fellow in Constitutional Studies at Balliol College, University of Oxford. He previously worked at the Constitution Unit between 2019 and 2024. He is a co-author of the forthcoming Unit report on reforming Northern Ireland’s political institutions. Sign up to the Unit’s mailing list to receive a notification when the report is published.  

Dr Etain Tannam is Associate Professor of International Peace Studies at the School of Religion, Theology and Peace Studies, Trinity College Dublin and Fellow of Trinity College Dublin. She recently published ‘British-Irish Relations in the 21st Century’ with Oxford University Press. 

Featured image: Prime Minister Keir Starmer attends the British-Irish Council (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by UK Prime Minister.