The Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee has published a report on the effectiveness of the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Alan Whysall argues that it is a much-needed contribution to informed debate. Its proposals for institutional change are unlikely to be implemented as cast. But similar reforms may be essential to the survival of the Agreement settlement.

Politics in Northern Ireland has been deadlocked for almost two years, leaving the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement unable to function. The Assembly does not meet; ministers have not been appointed to form an Executive; government is carried on by civil servants with very limited powers, with occasional interventions from London; there is financial disarray.

The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Jeffrey Donaldson, whose veto has led to the deadlock, has appeared for some months to be edging towards lifting it, despite profound differences of view between DUP leadership figures. Matters seemed to be coming to a head last week following publication of a British government offer to the main political parties of a financial package if devolution resumes. But it is now clear there will be no DUP decision before Christmas – although the Secretary of State, while announcing an improved financial package, declared that talks on resuming devolution were over: the government’s final offer was on the table. 

Into this context, the Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee published a timely report on the functioning of – and possible reforms to – the Agreement institutions. Though the report passed largely unnoticed outside Northern Ireland, this is much more than geekery. Institutional reforms may be essential to ensuring stable and effective government in the future, whatever the result of the current negotiations. Change will not be easy, however: the DUP opposed the report’s recommendations, and Sinn Féin appears cool towards them (see below). So the consensus that has generally been sought for changes to the Agreement is by no means present.

Summary of the report

The committee’s principal recommendation is for another report: an independently led review of the operation of the Agreement institutions, commissioned by the British government, in partnership with the Irish government, and in consultation with the parties. This review would be complemented by a citizens’ assembly.

The committee also makes recommendations for changes to the institutions, apparently permanent, in advance of the review. One, to be effective as soon as possible, would see the Speaker of the Assembly elected by a weighted majority of its members rather than a vote based on community designations – opening the way to break the DUP deadlock on the Assembly meeting. In addition, following the next Assembly election, the First and deputy First Ministers (FM and DFM respectively) would be called ‘Joint First Ministers’. And these offices too would be elected by weighted majority, again breaking the DUP veto on the formation of an Executive, though potentially not until 2027.

The DUP opposed the report: its members on the committee dissented (their minority report is set out in the minutes attached to the committee report). And Sinn Féin has not supported it. The party declined to give evidence to the committee (page 35, paragraph 81 of the report). In reaction to the report, it favoured the operation of the institutions being reviewed through an all-party committee (probably a reference to the Assembly and Executive Review Committee of the Northern Ireland Assembly – a body which, given the vetoes Sinn Féin and the DUP yield, does not have a record of achieving notable change).

What is welcome

Much about the report is welcome.

• It looks seriously at the structure and operation of the institutions. There has been limited informed public debate on many of the issues covered and the options for change. More often deals about the institutions have been reached behind closed doors, and there have sometimes been unexpected consequences. The committee attracted a wide range of evidence from politicians, former officials, academics and many others.

• It recognises that the political context has changed since the Agreement was negotiated 25 years ago, with the emergence of a substantial political bloc declaring itself neither unionist nor nationalist, which is disadvantaged by the current structures. The imbalance is not easily resolved, however, and Sinn Féin and the DUP, who at present have effective vetoes over key decisions, may not be keen to see it challenged.

• The report places emphasis on ensuring good government. This has often seemed a low priority in Northern Ireland politics, with grave consequences for public wellbeing – most conspicuously in the current operation of the health service, which in many areas seriously underperforms counterpart services in Great Britain.

• The report also stresses the importance of London giving priority to Northern Ireland affairs, and resuming the close relationship with Dublin which underlay much earlier political advance.

• And it covers in detail the North–South (Strand Two) and East–West (Strand Three) institutions. These are often overshadowed by the debate about the internal (Strand One) machinery. But some of them are in the overall Agreement scheme, politically significant, and currently dormant or restricted in their operation.

The problems

The proposals for immediate change on joint first ministers, choice of FM and DFM and election of a Speaker raise problems.

There is first one of principle: the committee appears to be inviting the British government, albeit working with the Irish and consulting the parties, to change aspects of the Agreement unilaterally. The Agreement has no amendment process; but it was arrived at by a large measure of consensus among the political parties participating. In seeking amendments, the two governments have sought a similar degree of consensus, often through major conferences (see Northern Ireland’s Political Future, page 66).

There is a substantial difference between the committee recommendations, for permanent change, and the suggestion of temporary changes necessary to permit the institutions to resume and function, while political discussion goes on about final arrangements.

On the specifics, the proposal to change the titles of the FM and DFM has much to be said for it in the abstract. But to make such a change after years in which unionists have had the notional top job, just at the point at which the first nationalist has become entitled to it (the leader in Northern Ireland of Sinn Féin, whose party emerged largest from the Assembly elections last spring) will seem inequitable to some, and potentially be a political breakpoint.

The proposal for changing selection of the FM and DFM is also difficult. It appears that it may lead to a unionist or nationalist not being at the top table, which, with each of those blocs still accounting for about 40% of votes, is unlikely to bolster stability. The truth is that recognising that politics has changed – that it no longer follows the binary model around which the Agreement was built – may logically suggest three joint first ministers, if it is not feasible to agree on one.

Much extra provision might also be necessary to permit an Executive so constituted to operate effectively – which, since it involves veto breaking, would be highly contentious.

Reaction

The committee’s work was well reported in Northern Ireland, but with limited support for its immediate recommendations.

The British government has not given any general reaction so far, but it did deliver one rather challenging view. As noted, the report emphasised the British and Irish governments working together: to which a Northern Ireland Office spokesman declared that ‘the structures governing the role of the Irish government in Northern Ireland affairs are set out in the Agreement. We are clear there is no role for the Irish government in matters relating to Strand One institutions…”.

This reading of the Agreement is open to serious question. It is true that, in the Agreement negotiation, the details of Strand One were discussed in a formation chaired by the British government without an Irish presence, based on a document formally prepared by the British government alone.

But the overall shape and balance of the Agreement was decided in plenary formations in which the Irish government was present; and what is being discussed here is fundamental to its essential architecture. The Agreement itself gives the Irish government a general right to make representations about any non-devolved decisions, hence about anything the British government might do in consequence of the report. It also gives it a role in reviewing the implementation of the Agreement.

Such a purported narrowing by the British government of the Irish role would have been unlikely in the years in which the Agreement was negotiated and given effect.

Where next?

It is perhaps unlikely that this government will take up the committee’s invitation to make immediate changes to the institutions, given the views of the two main parties. It may also be hesitant about setting up an independent review.

The fact the committee made the recommendations, though, is indicative of impatience about the DUP boycott and its consequences, not only among SDLP and Alliance members, but also among Conservative and Labour MPs at Westminster.

If the boycott continues, at some stage this British government or the next will need to address the possibility of changes to permit the institutions to resume (and may make little headway if it does not seek to bring Dublin with it).

And as the Northern Ireland political context continues to evolve, the questions the report raises about making accommodations to the new dispensation will become more pressing.

What the committee did not offer was a comprehensive assessment of the options available for reform. That may be the next crucial step in informing debate: developing the report, the body of evidence that the committee collected, and other recent contributions to the debate, into a more comprehensive agenda for discussion. This is something that a group of practitioners and academics could usefully work on.

After that, the issues will be a matter for political debate. There may then be good arguments for the sort of independently chaired review that the committee advocates, and for finding ways of greater civic society involvement. The options for change are not easy. And both of the largest parties are at times keen for self-interested reasons to preserve aspects of the present structure of the political system, even ones that inhibit it operating effectively. So, it is important that those parties do not drown out other voices. An independent review and civil society component may lead to a fuller and healthier debate.

Conclusion

If the institutions return soon, the sorts of change considered by the report become less pressing. But questions increasingly need to be asked about the suitability in current circumstances of the institutional framework we have inherited.

Institutional tweaks will not of course resolve all the problems. Northern Ireland has a political culture which at present prioritises traditional battles over stable and effective government. But institutional change may be a useful element in changing the culture.

The institutions must be returned to operation soon – and in a fully effective way, delivering public services, and making difficult decisions of public policy that have often been avoided in the past. And in other fields, serious efforts are needed, in London and Dublin as well as Belfast, to underpin the Agreement settlement.

If the challenge is not taken up by this British government in its later days, then it must be a high priority for the next, or the Agreement settlement may be increasingly unsalvageable. And if that happens, Northern Ireland politics may revert to a state of irreconcilable dispute over radically different constitutional destinies.

Alan Whysall provided written evidence to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, as did the Unit’s Professor Alan Renwick and Conor Kelly. Alan Renwick and Alan Whysall also gave oral evidence. These contributions were informed by the recent work of the Unit in these fields (most recently on Northern Ireland’s Political Future, and public Perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement).

About the author

Alan Whysall is a former civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office who advised British ministers throughout the negotiations that led to the 1998 Agreement. He is now an Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Unit, specialising in politics in Northern Ireland. He is the author of The Agreement at 25 and Northern Ireland’s Political Future.