A report on Reform of Stormont: Options for Discussion, by Conor Kelly, Alan Renwick and Alan Whysall, is published by the Constitution Unit today. Possible changes to the devolved government institutions are increasingly being talked about in Northern Ireland. The report presents a comprehensive analysis of reforms that have been proposed. It does not advocate for or against any of them, but rather aims to encourage a wider, more coherent and informed debate. Here, Alan Whysall summarises what is at stake.

The subject of institutional reform in Northern Ireland may seem dry and geeky. It is indeed technical, which inhibits public discussion. But proponents of reform say that the future of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may depend on it.

What is behind the debate? First, there is the susceptibility of the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly to collapse. Few people doubt that power-sharing, bringing into government people from across the community, is essential to establishing a sustainable administration in the present political condition of Northern Ireland. But the way it is implemented at present means that if one of the major parties – currently Sinn Féin or the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – does not wish to participate, the institutions cannot function at all. So Northern Ireland had no real government for three years after 2017, because Sinn Féin pulled out; nor for two years after 2022, because of the DUP’s withdrawal. Whether the 1998 settlement could sustain another long collapse is uncertain. Some would like to change the system, to make it more difficult for one party to collapse the institutions. Much of the debate focuses on the way the (co-equal) First Minister and deputy First Minister are chosen. But opponents of change might argue that such steps would hollow out the principle of power-sharing (and may also not be politically feasible).

Second, the way power-sharing is implemented is considered unfair by those who vote for parties whose Assembly members do not designate themselves ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’. The 1998 Agreement reflects a decidedly binary model of politics in Northern Ireland. MLAs who do so designate are given various veto rights in the Assembly and Executive. But no such rights attach to the votes of cross-community parties’ representatives, essentially those of the Alliance Party. Their numbers have grown significantly in recent years – exposing, they might say, the inappropriateness now of the binary model and entrenching sectarianism. If the Alliance vote rose substantially further, the system could be seriously unbalanced. Hence there is an argument for replacing designations and vetoes based on them, in the Assembly, and perhaps in constituting the Executive; a weighted majority system (where key decisions required affirmative votes significantly in excess of 50% of those voting) would underpin the power-sharing principle instead. But that would be a major shift from the approach in the Agreement.

Third, the record of the devolved institutions in delivering effective public policy and good public services is increasingly challenged. There is widely seen to be a good government deficit, where, for example, the health service seriously underperforms counterparts elsewhere in the UK on key measures, and there are yawning infrastructure gaps. The reasons, and the remedies, may relate largely to the culture of politics rather than the institutions. But the propensity of institutions to collapse, or to be stymied by intra-Executive stand-offs, and the ability of either of the main parties under the present rules to block any proposal, may be a significant part of the problem. There may be institutional approaches that would encourage the political system to face up more effectively to the serious public policy challenges that Northern Ireland faces.

The (non-designating) Alliance Party has long argued for reform; the (nationalist) SDLP, which in the present Assembly moved into opposition, has also taken up the cause. The House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC) conducted an investigation into the effectiveness of the institutions after the 2022 collapse, which elicited a substantial amount of evidence about possible reforms – although aspects of its recommendations were decidedly controversial, and quickly overtaken by the return of the institutions in February 2024.

The larger parties have resisted change – but lately, Sinn Féin has been content to allow discussion of reform possibilities. It now appears that the Assembly and Executive Review Committee (AERC) of the Northern Ireland Assembly will be conducting its own consideration of reform options.

At present, the British government is largely keeping quiet on the issue. Last year, the Irish government was publicly seeking reform, but it too for the moment is less vocal. But both are likely to be privately reflecting on reform options, which would certainly become a live issue if the institutions were again threatened with collapse. Prime Minister Keir Starmer maintains his own close interest in Northern Ireland, stating recently that the 1998 Agreement was the greatest achievement of the Labour Party in his lifetime.

Our report is an options paper. It aims to consider possibilities of reform to the domestic institutions of the Agreement that have been advanced, and a few others that logically might be considered – so long as they can plausibly be argued to be consistent with the broad principles and architecture of the Agreement.

The report does not advocate for or against reform in general, or for any particular change. It aims to offer a brief analysis of potential practical difficulties and wider implications, and interactions between potential measures. We are not presenting the report as the last word on anything. In some cases, it may be the beginning of a conversation. People closer to the day-to-day operation of the institutions may well have different perspectives.

But we hope it will help encourage a more informed and coherent public discussion. Previous changes have tended to be decided behind closed doors. It would be much preferable to have a wider debate – and in advance of any political emergency that requires early action. We hope that our paper will help the AERC to make a vigorous start in its work.

The report also looks at how change would properly come about – whose support would be needed. The Agreement in 1998 enjoyed a wide measure of support across the community in Northern Ireland; such a degree of consensus was prescribed as a condition of its adoption. Subsequent changes to the rules have generally been made with a wide measure of acceptance. But in the event of another collapse there is a question whether the same vetoes should apply to temporary arrangements to provide Northern Ireland with some government on a widely accepted basis, rather than another period of hiatus that could fatally undermine the current political settlement. Any such initiative might carry political risks, of course, depending on the circumstances of the time, and could indeed be destabilising.

The prospects for reform in the immediate future are probably poor – though measures to improve the institutions’ performance in delivering policy and public services may well have a better chance of adoption. But such prospects may change, potentially quickly, if we face further significant political difficulties. The time for serious discussion of reform is certainly here.

A full analysis and discussion of the possible reforms to Northern Ireland’s institutions is contained in our report, Reform of Stormont: Options for Discussion. To see previous posts and reports on Northern Ireland, visit the Northern Ireland section of this blog or the Nations and Regions page on our website.

About the author

Alan Whysall is a former civil servant in the Northern Ireland Office who advised British ministers throughout the negotiations that led to the 1998 Agreement. He is now an Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Unit, specialising in politics in Northern Ireland. He is the co-author of Reform of Stormont: Options for Discussion.