Continuing resentment against ‘establishment’ politicians has brought the right of recall back on to the legislative agenda

Robert Hazell discusses the challenges around developing legislation that will permit MPs to be recalled.

It was not a complete surprise to see the right of recall in the Queen’s Speech. The coalition government had kept open the option of legislating in a series of exchanges with the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee over the last two years.  The proposals stem originally from the MPs’ expenses scandal in 2009, which led all three major parties to include almost identical proposals for a right of recall in their election manifestos in 2010.  The precise commitment of the coalition parties in the May 2010 Programme for Government was framed as follows:

Image credit- UK Parliament

Image credit: UK Parliament

‘We will bring forward early legislation to introduce a power of recall, allowing voters to force a by-election where an MP was found to have engaged in serious wrong doing and having had a petition for a by-election signed by 10 per cent of his or her constituents’.

True to its word, in December 2011 the government published a draft bill and White Paper.  But in 2012 the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (PCRC) produced a very critical report, which led the government to pause.  The committee feared that the restricted form of recall proposed could reduce public confidence in politics by creating expectations that were not fulfilled.  The government’s long pause suggests that it may have shared the committee’s doubts.  But the rise of UKIP in the 2014 elections and continuing resentment against ‘establishment’ politicians tipped the balance: the government felt obliged to be seen to be doing something.

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Considering a constitutional convention for Scotland

The SNP have promised that an independent Scotland will develop a codified constitution.The other main parties have suggested that a No vote is a vote for a union in which Scotland is granted greater autonomy. But how should new constitutional arrangements be decided? Alan Renwick explores the options and concludes that the recent Irish Constitutional Convention could provide a useful model.

As the hullaballoo around the local and European elections begins to fade, attention is turning back to the main event in UK politics for 2014: the referendum on Scottish independence.  We are now in the official sixteen-week campaign period and, if the last few days are anything to go by, the two sides in the debate plan to continue screeching at each other much as they did before.  The Yes camp insists that Scotland’s economy will flourish following independence while the No camp counters that numerous economic dangers lie ahead.

Whatever we think about the independence question itself, an important part of the debate ought to focus on constitutional futures.  The SNP have promised that an independent Scotland will develop a new, codified constitution.  The other main parties, meanwhile, have suggested that a No vote is not just a vote for the status quo: rather, it is a vote for a new kind of union in which Scotland is granted greater autonomy.

But how would such new constitutional arrangements be decided?  So far, we have been told little.  Yet this is a crucially important question.  The traditional option is some form of royal or independent commission.  Such commissions have been used to formulate many proposals for reform of the Union in the past – from the Kilbrandon Commission in the 1970s to the more recent Calman, Richard, and Silk Commissions.  But they are quite inadequate for any deep reconsideration of constitutional structures.  First, while they might be good at answering relatively technical questions, they are not the best fora for settling issues where values and identities are at stake.  Second, they fail to engage the public in active participation.

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