Tag Archives: Ben Yong

Francis Maude’s Ambitious Civil Service Review

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In the mid-term ministers’ fancy lightly turns to thoughts of civil service reform. The current government is no different. In recent months, various figures in the Coalition have expressed growing frustration about the performance of the civil service. And so it comes as no surprise that Francis Maude, Minister for the Cabinet Office, announced at the beginning of August that he would commission a review of government structures in other countries and multilateral organisations. This review would include examining various governments’ operation and accountability, identifying best practices and making recommendations for how these could be adopted in the UK. It’s a competitive bid, all for the princely sum of £50,000.

You can read the Cabinet Office’s proposal here. It’s certainly ambitious. The Constitution Unit was mentioned as one of the possible contenders for the bid, which was very flattering, but unrealistic, for reasons we set out below. And it has recently emerged that a number of other think tanks have also politely declined to submit a bid.

It’s worth thinking about the practical aspects of the proposed review. The terms of reference are very, very broad. The successful external consultant is expected to look in detail at six different countries’ bureaucratic systems at a minimum; and to look not just at the relationships between ministers and the bureaucracy, and how policy advice is provided, but successes and failures, public and parliamentary accountability mechanisms … the list goes on. Some of these six countries—New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, France, the United States, Sweden—actually have very different systems with very different experiences. The review also insists on examining the European Union (why?).

The vast scope of the proposed review means that the external organisation would need a substantial number of staff already in place, or else a very, very quick recruitment process. That would exclude a good number of organisations (like the Unit, for instance). And the comparative nature of the review also means this large project team would probably need to be already familiar with the countries in question. So not just a large team, but a large expert team. Experts or consultants cost money. That sum of £50000 begins to look less and less realistic.

Moreover, the final report is meant to be ready within two months. That is a very short time indeed. As a point of comparison, the IfG—one of the biggest, most well-staffed think tanks in the UK—is taking one year to examine many of the issues raised by the Cabinet Office proposal.

The final kicker is that the external consultant is expected to meet regularly with the Minister so that he can discuss progress and ‘provide direction’ for the project. This, coupled with the implied requirement of familiarity with comparative public administration across six countries, the short time within which they are expected to deliver, and the low sum of money being offered, raises real issues of neutrality and impartiality. The terms of reference suggest that Maude already knows what he wants, but that he needs an ‘external’ consultant to somehow legitimate it.

A final point. Francis Maude is asking for too much, too quickly. If these are the kinds of goals he thinks are realistic, is it any surprise that he and his colleagues are disappointed by the performance of the civil service?

EDIT 28 September 2012: since this blog post, Maude has announced that the Institute for Public Policy Research has won the £50,000 contract.

Making Coalition Government Work: Lessons for the Future

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In 2011 the Constitution Unit spent one year examining how the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition works. We interviewed almost 150 people about the Coalition: individuals from both parties—both in and outside Parliament—as well as civil servants, journalists, and interest groups. We have just published the result of our study in a book: The Politics of Coalition: How the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Works.

We are particularly grateful to all those Lib Dems who were so generous in giving their time to be interviewed, and for Mark Pack’s very kind review of our book. And in the same spirit, we offer some thoughts on lessons for the future. Professor John Curtice argues that the conditions that led to a hung parliament in 2010 remain; and even if the boundary reforms goes through, the possibility of a hung parliament is still quite high. Even if, as some suggest, the Liberal Democrats will lose a large number of seats in 2015, they may still be in a position to determine the shape of a new government. So what lessons are there to be learned from the last two years of the Coalition, and how might the Lib Dems approach a hung parliament in 2015?

Our project was about making coalition government work. But how coalition works depends on the observer and their point of view. So some suggestions will be in tension with others: lessons for the smaller party may be at the expense of the larger party; lessons for the backbenchers may be at the expense of the frontbench, and so on. With this caveat in mind, here are some obvious suggestions.

Write a manifesto which is not geared towards single party government.

Think carefully about manifesto pledges: which ones are non-negotiable; which are bargaining chips? The party might be more careful about making firm commitments on unachievable goals. They might also think about having a more detailed manifesto. Many of the Programme for Government’s pledges are Conservative pledges because it was the Conservative manifesto which deal most with detail.

Preparation, preparation, preparation.

One of the key lessons from the 2010 hung parliament was that prior contacts and preparation made all the difference. Good relationships with the leaders and senior members of the other parties should be maintained, not least because they may become members of the negotiating teams. The other parties’ manifestos should be analysed for points of agreement and disagreement. Labour failed to do much of this, and it showed. For the Lib Dems, the problem was not so much a failure of preparation for a hung parliament, as it was a failure to prepare for government.

Take your time in negotiations over government formation.

Easier said than done. But arguably the five days to negotiate the formation of the 2010 Coalition was rushed: several Lib Dem interviewees regretted this. One Lib Dem minister we interviewed said:

If we’re going to be in coalition for five years, then you do want to spend a bit of time and avoid having tired people make a decision over four days . . . what I would do differently is to at least have a fortnight doing these things and getting things like support and . . . protocols. . . . and not having to backfill the whole time. And we’re still backfilling.

The 2010 negotiations focused mostly on policy, and everything else was secondary. The result was that the allocation of ministerial office was somewhat rushed, and the very important issue of party funding (Short Money and Cranborne Money) was completely forgotten. The latter in particular continues to have an impact on the capacity of the Lib Dems to act quickly and effectively.

Balance visibility and influence

The smaller the party, the more difficult it is to maintain visibility in the eyes of the public. The international experience is that the smaller partner in a coalition is often overshadowed by the larger partner, and in fact tends to do disproportionately badly at the second election.

In 2010, the Lib Dems went for breadth over depth: they sought to cover most of government by having a Lib Dem minister in all the Whitehall departments. That may have given the Liberal Democrats influence, but it may have come at the cost of visibility. A similar approach was taken to policy. In the future, an alternative for the Lib Dems might be to aim for visibility and limited influence, perhaps by taking a smaller number of high profile departments closely connected with the party’s key policy priorities.

Prioritise.

The decision to go for breadth over depth has a much broader impact for the Liberal Democrats. In trying to cover everything, the smaller party in the Coalition risks both overstretch, but also early exhaustion. This is not just so for the Lib Dem ministers in departments; Lib Dems in parliament have also struggled to maintain coverage.

Leaving aside whether or not one goes for depth over breadth, the Liberal Democrats need to think carefully about what is achievable. Aim high, but aim for tangible achievements. Instead of aiming for little wins across government, aim for a smaller number of high profile, high quality policies. Indeed, there are some signs that senior Lib Dems are beginning to focus and communicate in a more integrated way their key priorities.

Again, all easier said than done. Being the smaller partner in a coalition is never easy. But recognition of one’s weaknesses might be one place to start.

The Constitution Unit’s research on coalition government was generously funded by the Nuffield Foundation.

This blogpost was cross-posted at Lib Dem Voice.

No Surprises: more spads for No. 10?

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David Cameron has come under fire from some Tories who, believing the Government to be lacking direction, have called for the appointment of more Conservative special advisers (spads) to the No. 10 Policy Unit (see Neil O’Brien’s article for the Financial Times). They argue that the Government has placed too much emphasis on peripheral issues – such as reforming the House of Lords and introducing same-sex marriage – to the detriment of the Coalition’s primary objective: the economic recovery. How has it come to this?

In May 2010, Cameron and Clegg had been determined to reverse the trend begun under New Labour of employing large numbers of special advisers (spads).  The No. 10 Policy Unit was consequently stripped-back, leaving it unable to operate effectively.  The Government soon realised this, and in early 2011 a more generously staffed Policy and Implementation Unit was created.

The question was: how should it be staffed?  It was decided that, because the Policy Unit was intended to serve both the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, the group should be staffed by civil servants.  The reasoning was that Conservatives would be unlikely to follow advice given to them by Liberal Democrats, and vice versa.  The non-partisan civil servants, however, could offer advice free from political ideology—in theory, anyway.

Under the Coalition, the Civil Service has started to exert more influence.  Firstly, by its commitment to Cabinet government as a means of reaching consensus, the Coalition has bolstered the position of the Civil Service.  Secondly, the Civil Service has been encouraged to become more involved in matters of policy.  This latter point is a source of frustration to some Conservatives, who feel that departmental policies are being undermined by technocratic measures proposed by civil servants.  This, they argue, has led to a lack of coherence across government (James Forsyth, writing in the Spectator, examines this issue).  It taps into the long-held suspicion of civil servants as impractical and/or lacking in political nous.  And so some Conservatives believe that Cameron needs to regain political control over the Policy Unit by appointing more Tory spads.  As Charles Moore writes, ‘Conflict is usually better institutionalised than suppressed.’

Further information:

Project launch: the role of special advisers

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PRESS NOTICE

Thursday 3 May: for immediate release

The Constitution Unit launches a new project on the role of special advisers (Spads) to ministers. Are they sufficiently accountable? And are they making government more responsive?

The recent resignation of Adam Smith, Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s special adviser, raises important issues not just about the accountability of special advisers, but what their role in government is, say researchers at UCL’s respected Constitution Unit.

The Unit has begun a 15 month long project examining the issue of special advisers. It will ask some basic questions, which have rarely been asked: who are special advisers, what do they, and why it is that ministers regard special advisers as a vital resource?

Professor Robert Hazell, Director of the Constitution Unit, says: ‘The resignation of Adam Smith has raised questions about the accountability of special advisers: to whom are they responsible? And what is the appropriate role of the minister under which they work? These questions are not new and they will continue to be asked. Special advisers have now become a fixture in Whitehall, and so we need to ask some more fundamental questions. The role of special advisers is little understood: special advisers are seen as spin doctors, politicians in waiting, or wielding an inappropriate amount of power.’

Dr Ben Yong, lead researcher on the special advisers project, adds: ‘Leaving aside the current controversies over accountability, spads are here to stay. The number of spads has increased under the Coalition from 66 in 2010 to 83 in 2012. That is more than Gordon Brown ever had, and almost as many as Tony Blair had in his heyday. Accountability is important, but we also need to start asking questions about who spads are, what they do, and why ministers continue to appoint them.’

The project will examine the 350-odd special advisers in the period 1997-2012, looking at their history prior to government, and their activity following their time in government. This will also include interviews with former and current special advisers, their ministers and the civil servants who had contact with them. The aim is to ask not just how special advisers can be held accountable, but also how they can made more effective.

This project is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Ongoing updates on the project will available here:

 

Notes for editors

  • Robert Hazell is Professor of British Politics and Government and Director of the Constitution Unit. He is available for interview: contact r.hazell@ucl.ac.uk
  • Dr Ben Yong is a research associate at the Constitution Unit. He is available for interview: contact b.yong@ucl.ac.uk

The Cabinet Manual: where’s the beef?

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After almost two years of drafts, three select committee reports, the UK now has a Cabinet Manual. I received my shiny grey copy of the first edition of the Manual a few days ago, and am only just beginning to read it. The grey cover is completely appropriate of course: it is a civil service document through and through. Truly, it is—as Lord Hennessy suggested memorably—a herbivore’s document. Nothing wrong with that.[1] But this is not a manual that ministers will use. It is far too formal for that. That’s a shame, but early days: this is only the first edition.

As with all good and great things, the Cabinet Manual has begun to develop its own little academic industry—which, of course, one can only applaud. But it’s easy to talk about what could and should have been in the Manual: eg., more about the Human Rights Act, Europe, a better discussion of parliament and its conventions, etc etc…. the list goes on. Instead, I would like to briefly talk about two matters, which are connected.

First point: it’s a surprise that the Manual was published at all. It needs to be recalled that prior to 2010 there were a fair number of executive guidance documents of varying size and accuracy scattered in different locations, and in some areas of executive practice there was no guidance at all. There was little understanding that this might be a problem—not just because of the possibility of a hung parliament, but because the scattered, incomplete nature of these documents might impact upon executive effectiveness. More generally, there was a need for greater transparency or at least openness about government. Robert Hazell and Peter Riddell’s original submission calling for a Cabinet Manual was made with all three considerations in mind. And if you read the submission, you will notice that many of the points are made quite cautiously. That is because there was no guarantee that anything would be done. To put it differently, the Manual’s publication was by no means inevitable.

The second point is from my brief experience in the Executive: the aphorism ‘bills are made to pass like razors are made to sell’ applies equally to executive guidance documents. Just because a need has been identified doesn’t mean it can be answered in an ideal form. There is a process, or processes by which things happen within the executive; and the executive is not a monolith—it consists of different groups with different interests. And sometimes the silences, omissions and ambiguities of the Manual are unintentional, and sometimes they are deliberate. That is the nature of the executive, because it does not necessarily speak with one voice, and because the executive also has to be aware of the other branches of government.

Is this cryptic? I hope not. But my basic point is this. The Manual is an imperfect document. But to me it is still a surprise that we have the document at all. [2]

[1] So perhaps it should have been called ‘the Cabinet Office Manual’, as all three select committees recommended. That would make it clear that it is a manual for officials rather than for ‘Cabinet’.

[2] This is not a veiled way of saying ‘be pleased with what you got’. I only wish to point out that two years ago no such document existed.

Why Written Constitutions are a Good Thing

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The historian Linda Colley has written an article in the Guardian on the British experience of constitution-making. It is an argument about the uses of history. For too long, Colley argues, the British (the British elites, perhaps) have had a selective memory about constitutions and constitution making. Until the 19th century, there was a ‘cult’ of devotion in Britain towards various written constitutional documents—the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, and above all, the Magna Carta. This receded over time, and although this is not stated in the article, it may have been a response to the proliferation of ‘written’ constitutions, particularly on the Continent, and the need for Britons to distinguish themselves as different. Having said that, the British continued to draft written constitutions for their colonies well into the 20th century.

Colley’s point: it is not un-British to have or engage in a process of drafting a constitution. Britons have been interested and engaged in constitutional processes in the past; it is quite possible they still are. Colley ends by suggesting that years of ad hoc reforms and the increasing disunity of the United Kingdom may make a written constitution more important than ever. Whatever the drawbacks of a written/ codified constitution, one benefit may be it would offer “a single, recognised source from which citizens can learn about how their state is supposed to operate.” As they say, read the whole thing.

As an aside, the finalised version of the UK Cabinet Manual was published last week (more on this another day). I raise it not to point to its (murky) constitutional status, but rather to point to it as a neat inversion of Colley’s description of how constitutional ideas were transmitted from the centre to the periphery: the NZ Manual was the inspiration for the UK Manual. And so, New Zealand gives back to the Mother Country. It’s the least we could do.