McKay Commission Report: Parliament on the Sidelines … Again

28th March 2013

In a couple of earlier posts (here and here), I looked at the creation and operation of the McKay Commission on the West Lothian Question, criticising the fact that it was set up unilaterally by the Government, despite dealing with a core issue of parliamentary procedure.

Sadly, its newly-published report confirms this executive-centred approach to parliamentary reform.  The key section entitled ‘next steps’ (paras 248-9) contains phrases like “We envisage that the Government would first make an assessment of our proposals and put before the House..” and “When the House has expressed its views, we suggest that the Government should move for a select committee to advise the House on the details..”

Announcing publication of the report on 25 March, ministers said: “We will consider seriously and constructively this report and provide a substantive response to it in due course.”

The initial response from parliamentary officers and committees was ….. [fill in the blank].

Presumably Parliament is expected, as usual, to sit back quietly and wait for its executive masters to work out how it should operate.  The idea that one of the Commons’ select committees dealing with House matters (given the current Political & Constitutional Reform Committee’s inquiry into the ‘Wright Committee reforms’, we currently have 2 of them, ie it and Procedure Committee) should do a brisk inquiry into the subject of WLQ and the McKay Report, independently of Government’s own deliberations, is presumably far too revolutionary for the current House.  Ditto for some sort of initiative of this sort by the Speaker.

Or perhaps they will surprise us all?

What will become of the May 2015 UK Parliament if Scotland votes “Yes” on independence?

23rd March 2013

Every so often – but not very often – a major theme enters the national debate which nobody noticed much at first, but when attention is drawn to it, it becomes completely obvious.  This topic is one such we are pleased to  reprint, on how a referendum vote in favour of Scottish independence in September 2014 could greatly complicate the options for transitional UK government up to the general election in May 2015 and even more, the composition and form of the UK government thereafter.  The constitutional and political implications could be as fundamental for the reduced UK as for the departing Scotland.  The scenario is laid out in the Ballots and Bullets blog of the School of Politics and International Relations in Nottingham University. The authors are  Prof Ron Johnson of Bristol University, a leading authority on constituency boundaries and consultant on the proposed boundary changes in 2010;  the electoral geographer Prof Charles Pattie and David Rossiter, both of Sheffield University.
Ron was an expert commentator on the Conservative’s plan – aborted by the Lib Dems – to reduce the number of parliamentary seats by 50 and redraw boundaries to create constituencies of roughly equal size. The same team also warned that this policy would undermine” the underpinning of British representative democracy – that members of Parliament represent places with clear identities.”
The timetable for a Scottish Independence referendum in October 2014 and, if that is successful, implementation of the decision in March 2016 overlaps that of the fixed cycle for elections to the UK Parliament, for which the next general election will be held in May 2015. Governing the UK during that inter-regnum (when there will still be 59 Scottish MPs) will be difficult, as may forming a government after the May election, plus sustaining it after those 59 MPs depart in March 2016. And then there is the House of Lords…

Although opinion polls currently indicate declining support for Scottish independence, 18 months is a very long time in politics. Groups of civil servants are undoubtedly now working in both London and Edinburgh on the myriad issues that would have to be resolved should there be a positive vote in October 2014. Does their agenda include the following scenario?

  • Scotland votes clearly for independence, to occur – according to the SNP’s current timetable – in March 2016;
  • In May 2015 there is a UK general election (when Scotland is still a member of the UK). Labour wins 330 seats in the 650-member House of Commons, a majority of 10 over all other parties. Its complement of 330 includes 40 of Scotland’s 59 MPs. Labour forms a government; and then
  • In March 2016, the break-up of the United Kingdom occurs. The House of Commons is now reduced to 591 MPs, with Labour having 290; it no longer has a majority.

What would happen then?

Labour may go on governing – it would be only just short of a majority and, given that Sinn Féin MPs do not take their seats (and also that there are five of them then, as now), it could well get its business through. Alternatively it may reach an accommodation with one or more other parties – maybe even a LabLib pact (a full coalition is less likely).

If at some stage Labour loses a vote of confidence, however, then the procedures set out in the Fixed Terms Parliament Act, 2011, come into play: there may be a premature general election. And if that happens before late 2018, such an election would be held in the current 591 English, Welsh and Northern Irish constituencies – created using electoral data for 2000; following the Lords’ amendment to the Electoral Registration and Administration Act, 2013, the Boundary Commissions do not have to deliver recommendations for 548 new constituencies in those countries until October 2018.

Having voted for independence, however, the Scottish electorate may decide to send many more SNP MPs to Westminster in May 2015 – why vote for the parties of the now-rejected Union? Indeed, why vote at all?  It is doubtful that Labour could win a majority in England and Wales alone so David Cameron’s hopes of a Conservative majority over Labour and the LibDems in 2015 would be enhanced if very few Scottish MPs were elected to represent those two parties.

In addition, 11 of the Liberal Democrats’ current 57 MPs represent Scottish constituencies, so much will depend on how the soon-to-be-independent Scots vote in the 53 seats that currently return a non-SNP MP and how the MPs who replace them vote in the Commons during that inter-regnum (would they join with Labour and the Liberal Democrats in voting against the Queen’s Speech, for example, or just abstain?)

That might be a bit – perhaps very – messy, at a time when continuity and stability will still be preached as necessary conditions for economic recovery. As interesting – and potentially very controversial – will be what happens between October 2014 and March 2016, and especially between May 2015 and the latter date, whichever party (or parties) are in power. The government is already concerned about, and seeking a resolution to, the West Lothian problem: it will be magnified many-fold during that inter-regnum.

Once Scotland has voted for independence, what role should Scottish MPs play at Westminster during the following 18 months? Some might argue they should no longer participate – certainly not in its votes, though, of course, they should continue to represent their constituents’ interests that are covered by the transitional UK government (just as Sinn Féin MPs do now). But Scotland will still be a member of the UK and decisions will be taken during those 18 months on which they should have a say: what if the UK government recommends that the country goes to war somewhere in December 2014?

Would Scottish MPs agree to vote on a restricted range of issues only? Could agreement be reached on what those issues are? If not, would the government legislate to limit Scottish MPs’ roles in the House of Commons – perhaps with opposition support (the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats are all opposed to the break-up of the Union)?

And what of the House of Lords. What would happen to the Scottish hereditary peers? The 1800 Act of Union allowed the Irish peers to elect 28 members to the Lords. None were elected post-independence, but also none were required to relinquish their seats, with some remaining members of a ‘foreign’ Parliament until their death, which for one Irish peer was as late as 1961. A similar situation occurred after the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707, when the Scottish peers were entitled to elect 16 of their number to sit in the Lords. From then on all new peers were appointed to the Peerage of Great Britain (as were a few peers created after 1922 who took Irish titles). All Scottish peers were entitled to sit in the Lords under the Peerage Act, 1963, and became part of the electorate after most of the hereditaries lost their seats under the House of Lords Act, 1999. There is thus no Scottish hereditary peerage, merely a UK Peerage, and it would presumably be up to those who, post-independence, considered themselves Scottish rather than UK citizens to withdraw from the hereditary electorate.

Of course, all peers are now appointed for life, and many of those currently occupying the House of Lords benches have some Scottish links. But could a separate ‘Scottish Life Peerage’ be defined to identify them? On what criteria – residence (first, or second)? Some may self-identify and withdraw but others, like their Irish predecessors, may decide to stay. How could they be removed? Could a generic Act be conceived, or would there have to be a series of ad hoc pieces of legislation? And when it was all settled – it might take some time – would the Prime Minister then replace them with a new tranche to maintain the currently-desired party balance?

Uncertainties abound, but governing the UK may be very difficult during the transition period, even if there is good will on all sides.

Ron Johnston is Professor of Geography in the School of Geographical Sciences at the University of Bristol, Charles Pattie is Professor of Geography in the Department of Geography at the University of Sheffield, and David Rossiter.

SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN BILL – POSSIBLE UNTOWARD EFFECTS?

This asks whether the Bill risks any untoward, unintended practical consequences and considers what, if any, may be among the longer term, less direct implications for church establishment in England.

Direct effects

The short Bill contains three provisions: gender neutral primogeniture is to be retrospective from the date of the CHOGM 2011 agreement; heirs may marry Catholics without disqualification; and prior sovereign marriage approval is restricted to the first six in line where marrying without approval entails disqualification from succession without invalidation of marriage.

The Bill does not disturb the requirements that no Catholic may succeed, that the heir must be in communion with the Church of England, must make a declaration on accession that swears fidelity to the Protestant faith, and must swear at coronation to uphold the Church of England. It is therefore the case that heirs who become Catholics are still barred from the throne. This only partial removal of Catholic disabilities is why Catholic reception of the change has been one of muted joy – muted, that is, in England: Scottish Catholics have customarily been more outspoken about the remaining disqualifications.

The Prime Minister, David Cameron, made the government’s position clear at the conclusion of the CHOGM meeting on 28 October 2011:

The great strength of our constitutional approach is its ability to evolve. Attitudes have changed fundamentally over the centuries and some of the out-dated rules  – like some of the rules of succession – just don’t make sense to us any more

…we have agreed to scrap the rule which says that no-one who marries a Roman Catholic can become monarch. Let me be clear, the monarch must be in communion with the Church of England because he or she is head of the church. But it is simply wrong that they should be denied the chance to marry a catholic if they wish to do so. After all, they are already quite free to marry someone of any other faith.[1]

Catholic marriages

Concern has been expressed in both Commons and Lords committees and in the press[2] about the implications of the requirement in Catholic ‘mixed’ marriages that the children should be brought up as Catholics. The general concern is that somehow the way would be opened to Catholic succession. Such a result would  conflict with the requirement that the sovereign is automatically Supreme Governor and church establishment in England threatened accordingly.

It seems uncertain just how far Catholics in ‘mixed’ marriages are obliged by Catholic canon law to insist that any children must be brought up in the Catholic faith. A Catholic Herald article[3] was emphatic that children had indeed to be brought up in the Catholic faith but, although the present writer cannot pretend to be an authoritative interpreter of the relevant Catholic canons, they do not seem as emphatic as the Catholic Herald has claimed.[4] On the other hand, there is no doubt that any heirs who professed the Catholic faith would be excluded from the throne. There would be no need for the sovereign to withhold marriage consent to prevent a Catholic succeeding because the law would in any case prevent it. A clash of the kind envisaged would not therefore be possible. It is very likely, too, that unless they positively wishing to disqualify themselves, Windsor family members within shouting distance of succession will continue to be careful themselves to remain in communion with the Church of England and – to avoid any possible complications – choose Protestant brides

Indirect effects

The following looks at possible consequences for the monarchy on the one hand and the Church of England on the other.

Changing rules of succession cannot avoid drawing attention to the peculiarities of monarchy. Any system of primogeniture, gender neutral or not, must nowadays seem objectively a rum way of running a political system. Its very basis is to select a head of state as the result of accident of birth. Conversely, of course, the fact that the system produces certainty of a kind is in its favour. There is no demeaning push-and-shove scramble to slot celebrities – political or otherwise – into the position; there is a family continuity across generations; and the absence of merit can be, as Lord Melbourne declared of the Garter, a positive attraction.

The monarchy’s survival is the prime example of the effects of the relative absence of discontinuity in our constitution. Occasional Guardian squibs aside[5], it is difficult to believe that the monarchy will be affected adversely at all by the Bill. On the contrary, conditioned to accept the illogicality of the monarchy in the first place, a little apparent ‘modernisation’ can seem proof of the institution’s protean qualities in a situation where its lack of any real executive functions silently makes it politically acceptable. And, until further notice, it will remain a Protestant monarchy.

For the Church of England, the position is somewhat more complicated. Whilst there is an obvious dissonance between a monarchy which operates on a basis of gender equality and a Church which cannot yet bring itself to do so, current difficulties arising from the Church’s troubles over female bishops should not be allowed to mask profounder issues. The truth is that the threats to the Church’s status come less from the legislature than from larger societal changes. The Church has hitherto shown great sensitivity about its established character, that is the degree of its direct involvement with the state and its associated privileges/duties. Though far from moribund, it survives – in England alone – as the last remains of the confessional state mostly dismantled in the 19th century.

Inadvertently perhaps, in voicing its concern about the future of the supreme governorship, the Daily Mail put its finger on an important point: there may be religious freedom in the UK but there is not yet, because of the English establishment, religious equality. In a country where about half the population are now prepared to say that they belong to no religion, where active church affiliation is very much a minority sport, and where important and growing minorities practise non-Christian religions, the gap between the formal position – the Church is there to serve the whole English community – and the reality has continued to grow. Some members have for some time been asking whether sundering the remaining ties with the state might be good for both: a former diocesan bishop, for example, has questioned the continuing relevance of establishment.[6]

A previous blog has drawn attention to Anglican claims that the Church of England may now be regarded as in some way protecting other religions. This is clearly new doctrine in the sense that the role is one the Church has only recently sought to assume.  Moreover, the language suffers from the same difficulty of the coronation oaths: the Church is no more able to protect anyone any more than the sovereign can preserve the Church by virtue of a coronation oath – an oath which did not prevent disestablishment in Ireland or Wales. Perhaps such claims will fall to be regarded as the high water mark of the claims of a Church which nowadays accepts religious freedom but does not wish to concede religious equality.

In this situation, finding firm ground for the Church has been difficult. Its current ‘official’ position judging from the evidence of the Archbishops to the Houses Joint Committee on the Future of the House of Lords is to hold on to what it has, including the twenty-six bishops in the House of Lords whose departure would not in fact effect disestablishment. In the context of the current Bill, great importance has been attached to keeping the sovereign ‘in communion with’ the Church to avoid any inconsistency with that person also being Supreme Governor – a role nowadays devoid of any significant executive function. It is nonetheless that position that the government has endorsed in the Bill by seeking to remove only the Catholic prohibition least threatening to the Church.

It has to be asked whether it is right to keep the remaining anti-Catholic prohibitions and whether the Church should not contemplate more flexible and nuanced positions. If the Supreme Governorship were to become regarded more as a kind of super patronage role for any head of state in recognition of the Church’s historic role in England, would the religious affiliation of the sovereign be crucial? In a similar fashion, Fidei Defensor (handily without a definite article) could be reinterpreted, as the Prince of Wales has suggested, as a slogan/totem of religious freedom.

At present the Church might abhor a Catholic in the office of Supreme Governor because of the theological offence involved. But if the office’s character were changed to reflect what actually occurs, a non-contentious link with the monarchy could remain if wanted – a possibility the Prince of Wales seems to have envisaged.[7] After all, the Church already in fact itself controls all appointments to its senior posts, and legislates for itself under an admittedly advantaged procedure but one not wholly different from that for private bills. Even royal peculiars could keep a special status though one more completely distanced perhaps from the person of the sovereign. In such a situation, the sovereign could be free like everyone else to adopt any faith or none. Such pathways seem more promising than making unhistoric and vapid claims of faith protection. Coronations – which recognise rather than make sovereigns – could rise to new challenges in what Andrew Brown has called an ‘emotional or effective establishment, where the church is a natural theatre of society’s self-understanding’.[8]

Conclusion

The relative complexity – emotional, political, legal, administrative – of these issues are no doubt glimpsed by government. Of course, the government does not wish to plunge into these deep waters. It wants a quick, limited fix without too much argument. Commentators are right that there has been too little public discussion, but not all the blame can be laid at the government’s door. What is needed is fresh, bound-breaking thinking and most of that can best come only from within the Church itself.


[1] http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/prime-minister-unveils-changes-to-royal-succession/ (accessed 28 October 2011)

[2] Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, 11th Report 2010-12; Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, evidence session 9 January 2013; Daily Mail 7 January 2013. The latter purported to voice concerns of the Prince of Wales but without any evident authority.

[3] http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2011/10/31/why-shouldnt-there-be-a-catholic-‘supreme-governor’-of-the-church-of-england/ (accessed 17 January 2013). The article overlooks the significance of the requirement that the heir has also to be ‘in communion with’ the Church of England. Because no Catholic could therefore succeed to the throne under Mr Cameron’s proposals, much of the article’s relevant argument is vitiated.

[4] See Frank Cranmer’s article 9 January 2013 on the Law and Religion UK website analyzing the relevant canons – http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2013/01/09/succession-to-the-crown-bill-la-reine-ou-le-prince-le-veult/ (accessed 17 January 2013.

[5] ‘Britain’s Voodoo monarchy – The succession bill puts a ludicrous spin of equality on an institution that is inherently unequal’ – Guardian , 11 January 201.

[6] Peter Selby, Eric Symes Abbot Memorial Lecture, 10 May 2012.

[7] ‘I really can’t think why we can’t have Catholics on the throne’, quoted remark from the memoirs of Lord Ashdown noted at Blackburn R (2006) King and Country (London, Politico’s), p. 119.

[8] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/18/church-of-england-traditionalists-hiding-places/ accessed 13 January 2013.

 

Written by Bob Morris, formerly Home Office Under Secretary responsible for Constitutional Affairs. Leader of the Unit’s work on Church and State and also expert on FoI.

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WOMEN BISHOPS: SHOULD PARLIAMENT INTERVENE?

On 21 November 2012 the Church of England Synod rejected a draft Measure for the introduction of women bishops by a narrow majority of six votes in one of the Synod’s three ‘houses’, that of the laity.  Sufficient two thirds majorities were attained in each of the other two houses – bishops and clergy. Forty-two of the forty-four Anglican dioceses had previously supported the change.

The amended draft contained a compromise arrangement, linked with a putative ‘code of practice’, that would have permitted congregations opposed to women bishops on theological grounds to retain male only episcopal oversight. The opponents – from both the ‘catholic’ and evangelical groups – felt that the compromise did not go far enough to recognise their views. Ordinarily, Synod’s standing orders would prevent a failed draft Measure’s reconsideration until the next newly elected Synod – in this case in 2015. There is, however, an exceptional procedure which could bring the issue back for redetermination.

The latest available – 2011 – statistics show that ordained men amount to seventy per cent of the total of nearly 11,000 diocesan licensed clergy. But, although women constitute only one fifth of full-time clergy, they amount to just over half of both part-time stipendiary and self-supporting clergy.  Out of 111 archdeacons, 17 (15%) and of 36 cathedral deans 4 (11%) are women. All 44 diocesan and all 61 suffragan bishops are, of course, men.

The issues 

(a) For the Church

Having in the past been, if anything, in the vanguard on divorce and homosexual law reform in England, the Church continues to find difficulty in agreeing on issues of gender and human sexuality. These difficulties are not confined to disputes in England: they exist in the wider Anglican community too and now appear to be so irreconcilable as to threaten schism. Addressing these differences will be one of the primary tasks of the new Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, as they were for his predecessor, Rowan Williams.

The decision to ordain women priests in 1992 carried the implication that at some point episcopal orders would also be made available to them. Granted the strong reservations held by a minority in the Church, agreement to proceed could be reached only as the result of compromise – as had been the case in 1992 when, essentially, female ordination was secured on a basis of conferring a clerical status inferior to that of men. At that time, Parliament – through the Ecclesiastical Committee – was concerned that the minority should be reconciled. The question for the Church now could be whether any compromise satisfactory to the opponents of women bishops could be regarded as compatible with having women bishops at all.

(b) For Parliament

Parliament retains the ability to legislate for the Church. Since 1919, on the other hand, it has in practice ceded the legislative initiative to the Church itself. Above all, even if Parliament did decide to legislate directly, it is difficult to believe that it would be prepared to do so without the consent of the Church. If that consent were forthcoming, then there would, of course, be no reason why the Church should not take the initiative itself. Only if Parliament decided to proceed without the Church’s consent would there be a case for its intervening. But if it did so, it would intervene in the interests presumably of the majority party and negative any possibility of holding all the parties together. Contemplating such a sequence is to remind why Parliament conceded the right of legislative initiative to the Church in the first place.

The Public Worship Regulation Act 1874 was the last time Parliament legislated  for the Church when the latter was divided on an issue. The outcome was not a happy one. Five priests underwent terms of custody, and the bishops in the end vetoed all attempted proceedings rendering the Act a dead letter.

Evidence of the House of Commons’ present mood can be found here –

http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b01p2px8/The_Week_in_Parliament_23_11_2012/

In the BBC studio discussion, Ben Bradshaw, a member of the Ecclesiastical Committee, judged that the mood of Parliament is very different from that of 1992 when it could be argued that it was more concerned to protect the position of the objectors to female ordination than the status of female orders. Whilst that may well be so, it is also the case that Parliament has now in the Equality Act 2010 passed legislation which exempts priestly orders from the non-discrimination rules otherwise applicable. Requiring women bishops would amount to trenching on the religious freedom that the Act’s provisions were meant to protect.

Mr Field’s Equality Act 2010 (Amendment) Bill, which received its first reading on 22 November (and is due to receive its second on 18 January 2013), will presumably attempt to remove a protection permitted under the EU Directives the 2010 Act was designed to implement. If singling out the Church of England for the repeal alone, the Bill will itself be discriminatory: if the repeal is general, then it will be opposed by every other Christian denomination and all other religions as well. It seems unlikely that the bill will, or could ever have been likely to, obtain essential government support. In so far as that is the case, the bill looks more like a gesture of the moment than a credible and viable solution. This was similarly the object and fate of the Bishops (Consecration of Women) Bill, introduced by Andy Reed on 21 March 2006 (Hansard, Commons, cols 170-4) which made no further progress.

(c) For the Ecclesiastical Committee

Any draft Measure from the Synod will have to come through this Committee, and it will be a test of its judgement whether what it feels able to approve is acceptable to Parliament at large. The Committee is not a Parliamentary joint committee but in fact a statutory joint committee with equal Lords and Commons membership in a total of 30. It will no doubt weigh carefully whether it can in the event certify under the 1919 ‘Enabling’ Act ‘as to the [Measure’s] expediency thereof, especially in relation to the constitutional rights of all [Her] Majesty’s  subjects’. What it approves could be voted down in Parliament and that may temper any Committee enthusiasm to wave through a compromise in flagrant and indefensible default of gender equality. What may be an acceptable price of compromise in the Church may not be automatically acceptable outside so far as the rights of all Her Majesty’s subjects are concerned.

(d) For the government

There is unlikely to be any Ministerial enthusiasm for intervening. Parliamentary legislation would in practice have to be via a government sponsored bill. No government would want to start intervening in the affairs of a religious body. If it was seen to do so in this case, it would be invited to intervene in other controversies such as theological and property disputes not only in respect of the Church of England but also in the case of other religious denominations, Christian and non-Christian. Parliament last ventured into this territory very gingerly with the Church of Scotland Act 1921 which paved the way for the reconciliation of a major schism that had occurred in 1843. Ministers were careful in 1921 to ensure that the Act merely recognised a compromise reached by the parties rather than forcing one.

Is ‘disestablishment’ the answer?

In a situation where religious belief has greatly declined and, where it remains, is much pluralised, church establishment is a hangover from the confessional state – abandoned finally for most purposes in 1828-9 – where everyone in the UK outside Scotland had to be a member of the Church of England or suffer civic penalties. Church and state functioned together, inseparably. But the abandonment of the confessional state was not accompanied by severing that Church’s ties with the state. The disestablishments in Ireland in 1871 and in Wales in 1920 did not affect the position of what was left for England alone.

The key political and constitutional problem is that, although the Church of England now behaves largely as if it is a voluntary society, it remains nonetheless part of the state. The Queen as head of state is ‘Supreme Governor’ of the Church, must be in communion with it, holds the title ‘Fidei Defensor’, and – nominally – appoints its senior clergy. The Archbishop crowns and anoints the new sovereign, and the Church conducts important public ceremonies and rituals effectively in relation to the UK as a whole. The Church’s courts remain courts of the land, although they lost their public law jurisdictions in the 1850s. Twenty-six bishops continue to sit in the House of Lords – each nowadays since the Prime Minister withdrew his involvement in 2007 actually appointed by a private, unaccountable committee of the Church itself.

These are high matters and could be addressed again by Parliament. However, whatever the degree of change made, none could procure the appointment of female bishops unless Parliament legislated directly to that end. In other words, disestablishment could not by itself resolve the particular question of female bishops. On the other hand, what disestablishment could do would be – a very different matter – to permit the state and Parliament to wash its hands of Church of England affairs altogether.

Conclusion

Since nothing so far suggests that Parliament contemplates such a rupture, it follows that the Church must be allowed to deal with the present crisis itself. Whether in doing so it strengthens the case for a radical review of remaining  church/state ties is another question.

Written by Bob Morris, formerly Home Office Under Secretary responsible for Constitutional Affairs. Leader of the Unit’s work on Church and State and also expert on FoI.