The anatomy of democratic backsliding: could it happen here?

The term ‘backsliding’ has been coined to describe the phenomenon by which leaders who come to office within a democratic framework, only to attack some of democracy’s core features when in office. Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman outline some of the key features of ‘backsliding’, discuss how and why it can take hold, and whether there are warning signs that such a process could happen in the UK. 

During the presidency of Donald Trump, American democracy suffered the most serious challenge it has faced since the country’s Civil War. Trump and his administration inflamed divisions that jeopardise the rights of women and minorities; attacked the press; defied oversight; sought to stack the judiciary and law enforcement agencies with partisan loyalists; challenged the integrity of the electoral system, and ultimately stoked a violent challenge to the democratic transfer of power. These threats were different from conventional forms of democratic reversion, such as the coup d’etat. Instead, they reflected a more insidious process that has come to be known as ‘backsliding,’ in which illiberal leaders rise to power within a democratic framework and attack core features of democracy from within.

Because the United States occupies a unique position at the heart of the international system, backsliding there commanded worldwide attention. But the United States was hardly alone. In a new study, we identified at least 15 other countries in which duly-elected democratic governments recently moved along similar paths. Not all of these paths lead all the way to autocracy; in the United States, democracy survived the Trump era badly damaged but intact. But depending on the metric used, more than half of these cases slid into ‘competitive authoritarian rule’: systems in which elections persisted but were manifestly rigged. Notably, although many of the failed democracies we examined were weakly institutionalised at the outset (for example, Bolivia, Ukraine, and Zambia), others such as Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela were once considered relatively robust democratic regimes.

These cases raise the question of whether similar adverse developments could occur in other seemingly stable democracies. Could they perhaps even happen in the UK? 

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Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland: Final Report

The final report of the Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland is published today. In this post, Alan Renwick, the Working Group’s Chair, outlines what the Group has sought to achieve, explains how it has pursued these goals, and highlights some of the core findings. He points out that, while there is no certainty that a referendum will happen any time soon, policy-makers need to be aware of the decisions that might have to be made.

The Working Group on Unification Referendums on the Island of Ireland was established approaching two years ago to examine how any future referendums on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status would best be designed and conducted. Based at the Constitution Unit, the Group comprises 12 experts in politics, law, history and sociology, from universities in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Great Britain and the United States. Since coming together, we have pooled our expertise – meeting at first face-to-face and later online – and listened to as many voices as we could, including politicians, former officials, journalists, community organisers, academics, and members of the general public. We have held dozens of in-depth conversations and received numerous written submissions. Our public consultation last summer attracted 1377 responses, which we have carefully analysed. Last November, we published an interim report setting out our draft findings. Through four public seminars, direct correspondence, and monitoring of traditional and social media, we have logged over 300 responses to it. Our final report takes account of all of that feedback.

The Working Group’s starting point

A crucial feature underpinning all of this work has been our starting point. The Group has no collective view on whether it would be desirable for referendums on Northern Ireland’s constitutional future to take place, or what the outcome should be if they do happen. Speaking personally, my interest in this subject stems from my broader work on how to conduct referendums well, including the Independent Commission on Referendums, which reported in 2018, and the 2019 Doing Democracy Better report, co-authored with Michela Palese. I have no position on where Northern Ireland’s future should lie.

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Can Boris Johnson stop Indyref2?

With the Scottish Parliament elections approaching, the Unit gathered together three experts to discuss the prospect of Boris Johnson seeking to block a second Scottish independence referendum, and how the Scottish government might respond to such efforts. Charlotte Kincaid summarises the contributions.

With the May 2021 Scottish Parliament elections approaching, and the recent attention on the continuing political conflict between First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and her predecessor Alex Salmond, eyes are very much on Scotland and the prospect of a second independence referendum (‘Indyref2’). Boris Johnson has said he would refuse a referendum, but is this possible, and what would be the ramifications? To explore the possibility of Indyref2 and how such a referendum would be brought about, the Constitution Unit hosted a webinar with three experts: Professor Aileen McHarg of Durham Law School; James Forsyth, political editor of The Spectator magazine; and Dr Alan Renwick, Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit. The summaries below are presented in order of the speakers’ contributions.

Professor Aileen McHarg

Professor McHarg explored a number of pathways to a referendum from a legal perspective. She first addressed if the UK government can prevent a second Scottish independence referendum: it can, and it isn’t required to agree to a Section 30 order, or amendments to the Scotland Act to enable Holyrood to legislate for a second referendum – as was the case for the 2014 referendum.

But can the Scottish Parliament legislate for a referendum without a Section 30 order? This is less clear. The SNP has marked its intention to unilaterally introduce a referendum bill with or without a Section 30 order if it wins a majority in Holyrood following the May elections. If the bill passed, it would be subject to legal challenge. If the bill were judged as beyond the Scottish Parliament’s competence, any referendum which followed would not have a legal grounding, and in Aileen’s view, the idea of a referendum was ‘a non-starter’. She described talk of a wildcat referendum – such as that experienced in Catalonia in 2017 as ‘entirely misplaced’. There would be questions concerning the legitimacy of a unilaterally-called referendum, even if it were ruled lawful by the Supreme Court; unionists may be unwilling to engage in such a referendum.

Another possible pathway, although unlikely, is Westminster legislating to dissolve the Union. This is possible because a referendum on Scottish independence is not a legal requirement of independence.

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