Job Advert: Research Assistant (0.4FTE)

The Constitution Unit is the main research centre in the School of Public Policy at University College London, focusing on constitutional reform and comparative constitutional study. The Unit has a strong policy focus and works closely with government, parliament and the courts. It currently has five senior researchers, four research assistants and various research interns.  It is a stimulating work environment with a strong tradition of supporting young researchers and growing their skills and experience to the fullest extent.

The Constitution Unit is seeking to appoint a Research Assistant to work alongside the Deputy Director Dr Meg Russell, in her work on parliament. Responsibilities include conducting literature searches, compiling bibliographies, inputting and analysing data, arranging interviews and updating project websites. The post is funded for 1 year from the start date and we are looking to recruit as soon as possible.

Key Requirements

The successful applicant must have a 2:1 degree or above, in politics or a related field, and a good knowledge and understanding of British politics.  They will have strong research skills, excellent written English, strong IT skills, and a good track record of prioritising their own workload and meeting deadlines. Knowledge of the British parliament, and experience of using Access databases and/or research software such as Endnote, SPSS and Nvivo would all be an advantage.

Further Details

A job description and person specification can be accessed at the bottom of the page. To apply for the vacancy please read the submission requirements carefully and click on the ‘Apply Now’ button below.

Informal enquiries may be made to Dr Meg Russell (meg.russell@ucl.ac.uk). If you have any queries regarding the vacancy itself or the application process, or you require a paper version of the details, please contact Sydonnie Hyman email s.hyman@ucl.ac.uk, tel +44 (0)207 679 4944.

Deadline for applications: Monday 16 April, 9.00am

Interviews are expected: Monday 30 April

Documents

Applications via the UCL job site:

Prime Ministers in Power: Political Leadership in Britain and Australia

New book by Dr Mark Bennister, Lecturer in Politics at Canterbury Christ Church University and Honorary Research Associate at the Constitution Unit (Palgrave, 2012) ISBN: 9780230273214

Tony Blair and John Howard appear to be incongruous choices for comparative analysis. Howard was from the ideological right of Australian politics, with a leadership style based on experience and an uncharismatic, cautious, bureaucratic persona. Blair was the charismatic, new progressive centre-left leader with an emotional, thespian style, stressing vision and moral imperatives. Yet, it is possible to identify both personal and institutional similarities. This book argues that both leaders stretched the institutional resources available to them and enhanced their own personal capital. Over time, the political capital generated by each inevitably fell away to the extent that they both (although for contrasting reasons) left office in 2007. Prime Ministers in Powerinvestigates prime ministerial predominance in Britain and Australia. It is a timely addition to the scholarly material on political leadership, adding a comparative dimension by using case study analysis of two prime ministers in similar political systems. How did these two prime ministers establish such predominant positions? How far can prime ministers stretch the institutions within which they work and how much of an impact does the office-holder have on the office? What conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the two prime ministers? What are the consequences and costs of such predominance? This book addresses these questions, offering a comparative perspective on the nature of prime ministerial leadership.

Contents:

PART I

  • Introduction: Comparing Prime Ministers

PART II

  • Cabinet as a Resource
  • Prime Minster and Party
  • Controlling and Strengthening the Centre

PART III

  • Prime Ministers: Personal Capacity
  • Splendid Isolation: Personalisation and Autonomy

PART IV

  • Comparative Perspectives and Conclusions

Publisher and purchasing details:

Reviews:

‘Mark Bennister’s book will be essential reading for all students of prime ministerial power and executive governance. He moves the debate onto new territory, using a comparative approach (looking at Tony Blair in Britain and John Howard in Australia) and integrating analysis of institutional and party factors, personal skills and leadership styles. Bennister is a careful, systematic and forensic analyst. The book offers many insights into Blair and Howard’s long years of predominance but works successfully also as a primer on how to go about making sense in general of Prime Ministers as political leaders.’  (Kevin Theakston, Professor of British Government, University of Leeds)

‘This book makes a significant new contribution to our understanding of comparative political leadership. Through an exhaustive and clear analysis of the personal and political resources at their disposal, it reveals how two very different individuals working in distinctive political settings – former British prime minister Tony Blair and the ex-premier of Australia, John Howard – each found ways of stretching their power through personalized electoral appeals, although each was ultimately constrained by party colleagues. Mark Bennister has produced a valuable new study that deserves the attention of all serious students and scholars of political leadership.’  (Paul Webb, Professor of Politics, University of Sussex)

‘Mark Bennister’s comparative study of Tony Blair and John Howard is a revelation. Few are the books that allow us to see across national difference to recognise the core elements that empower or limit prime ministers. Rarer still are those that can overcome a narrow focus on institutions, or personalities, or the core executive to encompass all of those things and adroitly to demonstrate that only through understanding their interaction will we see how power is gained and sustained. This is a major contribution to prime ministerial studies and to leadership analysis at large.’ (James Walter, Professor of Political Science, Monash University, Melbourne)

The McKay ‘West Lothian’ Commission: Two Cheers?

In a post last month on this Blog (here) I looked at the new McKay Commission on the West Lothian Question, and especially at its status and operation, given that it  was set up, and is sponsored, by Government, not Parliament. It argued that, despite this provenance, to have any credibility and utility it needed to demonstrate independence, openness & transparency, and real public and parliamentary engagement. This includes a genuinely open evidence-taking process, and transparency through, for example, a live website and an initial ‘consultation paper’.

The Commission met for the first time in late February, and it seems some of this minimum agenda has been adopted. For example, there is now a website – note the word ‘independent’ in the address, akin to that of the Silk Commission on devolution in Wales, a similar Government established and resourced commission. It is, at this early stage, a bit thin, but potentially it can be used as the engine of its operation in much the same way that the impressive, content-rich Silk Commission site has developed.

The crucial tests are those of openness & transparency and of genuine, evidence-based engagement with public and parliaments. For example, the Cabinet Office press release on 17 January suggested that the Commission “will be expected to call experts to give oral or written evidence.” The website front-page now invites “submissions and enquiries from those with an interest or views on the West Lothian question”, though its 2 March press release (hands up, all those who spotted this!) is a bit more engaging, stating that “the Commission is keen to hear from those with views on the subject of the West Lothian question” and quotes its Chair, Sir William McKay, as saying that “the Commission had a productive first meeting and will be meeting again soon to develop its thinking and initiate arrangements to progress its work.”

Does this mean that it is starting with a genuinely blank sheet of paper, within the terms of its remit, or that it is to be largely expert-driven, with a veneer of public engagement? We must hope the former, ie not just ‘transparency’ (“look, but don’t touch”) but genuine ‘openness’. That requires a more positive and engaging approach than has been suggested thus far – again the Silk Commission (and earlier devolution inquiries like Calman or Richard) can provide a model to learn from. If the Commission is not in a position yet to issue a consultation or ‘issues & questions’ paper, as a focus for its inquiry, it could state that it intends to do so, as a prelude to formal evidence-taking or public/parliamentary consultation.

That the Commission requests submissions by 13 April is potentially concerning, unless this is just intended to be a preliminary phase, prior to a more formal consultation/evidence-gathering process which includes the public. However, the Commission said on 2 March that its next meeting will be in late March and “it is planned that evidence will be heard by the Commission in April, May and June. Dates and locations of forthcoming meetings will be published through the website over the coming weeks in March.”

There remains the thorny issue of the extent of its remit. Even apart from what ministers say is expected to be excluded (especially devolution funding and Commons representation), the Commission needs, initially, to set out very clearly and openly how wide or narrow it sees its terms of reference. Will they include, for example, ‘Sewel Convention’ aspects, or inter-parliamentary relations? Will they take account (and if so, how?) of the three devolution ‘settlements’ as being dynamic processes, as with the current Scotland Bill, the Silk Commission and the looming Scottish Independence Referendum, so that their proposals are adequately flexible and robust to accommodate conceivable developments in the coming years?

So, two cheers for now, and a hope that the third cheer will be soon deserved.

Justice Committee FOI Evidence: A Quick Guide

The Justice Committee has received 112 submissions providing evidence on which to base their post-legislative scrutiny of the FOI Act. Twenty-five per cent of these are from universities, or bodies representing them, making HE by far the most vocal sector.

A number of common themes have emerged. One point, made by the Information Commissioner, among others, was that public authorities should be allowed to reject requests on the grounds that they are “frivolous” as well as that they are “vexatious”. This would allow them to bin queries which, while not calculated to harass or annoy the Council, are simply very silly. Bad news for the “Concerned Citizen” who caught Leicester City Council napping when he asked what planned to do to fight the zombie menace.

Many public authorities complained about the cost of dealing with FOI requests, and more generally, the costs that currently ‘don’t count’. Requests are cost-barred if the price of answering them would be more than £600 for central government and £450 for everyone else . Staff time is valued at £25 per hour. Time spent considering exemptions or redacting certain information does not count towards the total.  Leeds Council said  that this results in underestimating of the real cost of FOI, not least because an hour of staff time costs them more than £25.

The Ministry of Justice, and the NHS Foundation Trust Network, are two among a number of public authorities who worry about who benefits from FOI. In some cases, they say, commercial organisations use the Act to gain a competitive advantage. This means that the FOI Act is effectively subsidising certain businesses- which they claim was not Parliament’s intention when passing the Act 12 years ago.

Oral evidence by journalists the following week- Martin Rosenbaum, Doug Wills, David Higgerson and David Henke – raised a number of points relating to their experience as requesters. Although the Act had caused a “sea change” in access to information, it has not created a culture of openness among public authorities. Despite apparent commitment to FOI, every so often, Martin Rosenbaum said, “the mask slips” and the true face of government emerges. The Home Office have even accidentally sent him an email discussing the department’s desire to keep certain documents secret, because they show that there is a lack of evidence to support Home Office drugs policy.

The four said Act has altered journalistic practice. It has encouraged whistle blowers, because they now do not need to hand over documents to journalists. Instead, they can simply recommend a FOI request. Additionally, some stories now begin with a request made by a member of the public. This means that more voices are heard in the public debate. But it doesn’t always improve the quality of that debate. On the contrary, sometimes it “improves the quality of people’s prejudices”, by allowing them to feed their hunger for information only on their personal favourite titbits.  They also noted the hypocrisy of organisations that complain about request volume, and also complain about requests from journalists.  Journalistic use of FOI, they said, is efficient:  the information extracted is published and the media’s entire audience, instead of just one person, can be informed.

We submitted oral, as well as written, evidence to the Justice Committee based on our different research projects over the years. We reiterated our conclusions that the Freedom of Information Act has succeeded in its core objectives of promoting the transparency and accountability of public bodies. However, the Act was also sold as a mechanism that would increase public trust and participation, improve the quality of decision making and improve public understanding of the political process. It is almost impossible to measure whether or not it has delivered on these promises and moreover, these policy goals are somewhat out of FOI’s reach (see our previous post on the problem of measuring, let alone increasing public trust, for instance).  We also stressed the problems of measuring ‘concentrated costs’ of FOI against ‘dispersed ‘benefits’, which inherently skews the discussion. You can see this reflected in the submissions themselves, few of which attempt to quantify FOI’s benefits in monetary terms, but are quick to try calculate its costs.

Jim Amos, drawing on his experience in researching and also training FOI, also asked FOI officers to help themselves, adding a pragmatic note to the review’s proceedings. The way to make sure the Act works well is not necessarily amendments and fees, but “robust professionalism”. Public authorities should make use of the exemptions and the cost limits available to them. What they should not do is work very hard to fulfil unreasonable requests, and then complain about the burden involved in doing so. Whatever the results of this post-legislative scrutiny, this advice ought to be heeded.

The Wright Way to Infantilise the Commons

The short Commons debate on Monday 12 March on procedural changes to the Backbench Business Committee (BBBC) provided further proof that Government (and front benches generally) has no intention of ceding its dominance over the parliamentary agenda in any fundamental way, and will permit ‘reform’ only on its own terms and in its own good time.

What a pity that the vast legions of the ‘conventional wisdom’ – in academe, media and inside Westminster itself – will no doubt ignore this, as they have all clear signs in the last few years that the alleged empowering of Parliament, through the reforms proposed by the Wright Committee, is being skewed and diluted by ministers and their allies. The Backbench Business Committee is hailed as the battering ram which is breaching Government control of Commons business (what is discussed and when etc.), leading to the ultimate prize of a ‘full’ House Business Committee in the coming year.

I have blogged on all this, both in this Blog and elsewhere (eg here, and here), arguing for genuine Commons control (on behalf of the public they represent) of their own House and its operation, especially in respect of its business.  Monday’s debate is a good example of a government (any government) unilaterally deciding to propose its own changes to a select committee – and the one which is supposed to determine Backbench business! – at a time of its own choosing, and, according the BBBC’s chair and others, not only without consulting that committee in advance but also in the middle of a Procedure Committee review of the BBBC.  Because Ministers control time, all backbenchers can do is complain about it, or try to prevent it through amendments, when surely in any mature parliament worthy of the name, the timing of such a debate and the content of any proposed motions would be a matter for the House itself – through some form of genuine Business Committee.

The standard ministerial excuse is that all Government is doing is ‘providing an opportunity’ for debate and ‘facilitating’ discussion through its agenda-setting.  Note, in passing, that this debate was held alongside ‘sexier’ ones on MPs standards, guaranteed to monolopolise the limited available political and media interest.  Even worse, the minister putting all this through was  David Heath, Deputy Leader of the House (and my local MP) – the same David Heath who, when in opposition, demanded “An Everest of reform … to bring this House and our politics generally up to speed – into the 21st century – and make it fit for purpose” and declared that “It should not be for the Leader of the House – or the shadow Leader of the House, or me – to determine what will happen. It should not be for anyone to dictate to the House how we are to conduct our business.” Oh, I forgot, he’s now only ‘providing opportunities for debate and decision …. 

Mr Heath is learning all the front bench business manager tricks. For example, he said on Monday that “Wright is not holy writ and should not be treated as such, not least because there are internal contradictions in the Wright report, just as there are sometimes in holy writ.”  In other words, we in Government can cherry-pick what we want out of the Wright reform blueprint, and ignore or change what we dont like.

The conventional wisdom seems to be that the best – indeed, only – sensible strategy for acheiving reform is to go along with the Government (as has been done over the Government’s own unilateral e-petitions system being dropped into the BBBC mix) and to try and ‘save’ as much of the Wright blueprint as possible.  We can argue how radical Wright really was, in that glorious window of opportunity provided fleetingly by the expenses scandal of 2009.  What the incrementalists and trimmers have to demonstrate now is that when (perhaps, if) they actually can claim success over a full House Business Committee, it will be one worth having, and that the arrangement of Commons business will have really shifted decisively from the Government (and front benches more generally) to the House collectively on behalf of the people.

Monday’s debate confirms that the omens are not good.  But there may just be time for those who profess to seek genuine radical reform to act before it is too late, and try to overcome the House’s self-defeating acquiescence to government initiative over parliamentary reform.  After all, it was the Wright Committee itself which rightly asserted, in unequivocal terms, that “Time in the House belongs to the House,” and warned that  Government control of parliamentary time “infantilises Members.“  Time to grow up!

Holy see?

As  noted in our Monthly Update, an English priest has recently
suggested that the Vatican should consider implementing a Freedom of Information (FOI) law.

Father Alexander Lucie-Smith raises an intriguing, but sadly fanciful prospect. FOI is fundamentally a tool for citizens to hold their democratically-elected officials to account. Setting aside the obvious problems with that sentence vis-à-vis the Vatican, in practical terms the core issue would be one of administration.

Lucie-Smith writes that FOI legislation would help dispel the myths and conspiracy theories surrounding the Catholic Church and make it “harder to claim that the Vatican was addicted to cover-up.” As those making these claims are from outside of the Vatican state, our hypothetical “VFOI” would need to be similar to the UK law and allow non-citizens to make requests. Yet while the rest of the world doesn’t care enough about Britain to inundate our public servants with FOI requests, the Catholic Church has a somewhat larger ‘fan base’ with an estimated 1.181 billion Catholics worldwide.

The Constitution Unit estimates that local government in England received approximately 196,000 FOI requests last year. Obviously many of those came from the same source, but as a very (very) crude calculation, that is equivalent to 0.4% of the population of England each sending a request. If 0.4% of Catholics were to contact the Vatican, that would amount to 4,724,000 information requests a year!  Of course, that’s not including groups such as HIV/AIDS awareness campaigners, human rights activists, in addition to the contingent of conspiracy theorists, militant atheists, and countless others who would no doubt flood their inbox with questions, legitimate and vexatious. In short, due to the sheer scale, “VFOI” would be a massive cost sink and a bureaucratic nightmare.

The Vatican state is the smallest in the world, with a grand total of 832 citizens, all of which are in the employ of the state in one manner or another. Consequently, the only citizens to hold officials to account are other officials, and so any sort of “domestic” public disclosure would amount to “whistleblowing”, such as the current – most likely politically motivated – “Vatileaks” scandal. It could be that what the Vatican needs is not Freedom of Information, but something closer to the Public Interest Disclosure Act which affords protection to whistleblowers from their employers, subject to a public interest test. However, in a state without a public, what is the public interest?

Scottish independence referendum should be lawful, fair and decisive

Ten years ago the Constitution Unit produced a book called Scottish Independence: A Practical Guide, written by Jo Murkens and Peter Jones, and published by Edinburgh University Press.  The product of an 18 month research project, it is still the most detailed study of the legal and political steps Scotland needs to take to achieve independence.  But attending two conferences last week on Scottish independence, one in London and one in Edinburgh, has led me to change my views on some of the issues addressed in the two consultation papers issued by the Scottish[1] and UK governments[2] last month.  In this post I order my comments by reference to the two governments’ shared objectives that the Scottish independence referendum should be lawful, fair and decisive.

The law 

In our book we drafted a referendum question which we thought was within the powers of the Scottish Parliament.  It was very similar to the SNP government’s first proposed question in their 2007 White Paper[3] :

‘The Scottish government should negotiate a settlement with the government of the UK so that Scotland becomes an independent state’.

That referendum would not be decisive: it would authorise negotiations, no more.  Many distinguished constitutional lawyers in Scotland (Profs Christine Bell, Tom Mullen, Stephen Tierney, Neil Walker) believe that the Scottish Parliament has the power to legislate to hold such an advisory referendum[4].  But other distinguished lawyers disagree, including Lord (Jim) Wallace, the Advocate General for Scotland[5], Aidan O’Neill QC[6] and Prof Adam Tomkins[7].   So did the House of Lords Constitution Committee in their report published in February Referendum on Scottish Independence[8]

Having read all the legal arguments, I now accept there is doubt about the validity of a referendum authorised solely by the Scottish Parliament.  There would be legal challenges, brought by third parties, if not the UK government, which would go all the way to the Supreme Court.  I don’t think it is desirable for the courts to get involved in such an intensely political issue.  If that is accepted, the only way to resolve those doubts is for the UK government to offer to facilitate the referendum, as it has done in its recent White Paper.  It has offered to do so either by legislating at Westminster, or by making a s30 Order under the Scotland Act to extend the powers of the Scottish Parliament to hold an independence referendum.

I have previously argued that the UK government should stay out of the Scottish independence game.  It is an SNP project: they should let Salmond make the running, and allow him to hold the referendum at his own timing and on his terms.  If they enter the field of play they risk getting tripped up.  But once the UK government gets involved in facilitating the referendum it is hard for it not to get involved in decisions about the fairness of the question or the legitimacy of the result.  There are several issues here: the wording of the referendum question; the timing; who supervises the referendum; whether there should be a second question on Devolution Max; and whether there should be a second referendum at a later time.

Fairness and legitimacy

On the wording of the independence question, Salmond’s latest proposed question ‘Do you agree that Scotland should become an independent country?’ seems simple and straightforward.  But it can be criticised on two grounds.  First, that it invites agreement.  Second, not everyone will understand what is meant by ‘independent’.  We learned when writing our book that many people understand ‘independence’ to mean greater autonomy.  That is why our proposed referendum question spoke of Scotland becoming ‘a sovereign state, separate from the UK’.  The SNP hated that: they say that ‘separate’ is used only by opponents of independence.  But we would argue that it is necessary, for clarity.  If the Electoral Commission are put in charge of the referendum, as the UK government want and the Scottish government seem likely to agree, they will advise on the intelligibility of the question.  They take this duty seriously, testing different versions of the question, and they advised changes to the wording of the Welsh referendum in March 2011, and the English mayoral referendums in May 2012.  The Scottish government and Parliament are not obliged to follow the Electoral Commission’s advice; but the UK government might withdraw its support if they decline to do so.

Timing of the referendum

This is primarily for the Scottish government to decide.  The UK government should not intervene on the basis of arguments about damage to the Scottish economy, or which date is most favourable to the Unionist or nationalist cause.  But the UK government does have two legitimate concerns.  One is to avoid dates which coincide with elections: that can lead to a confused debate.  The second is to avoid dates too close to the next UK general election, scheduled for May 2015.  If the referendum is held in October 2014, and Scotland votes for independence, that presents a dilemma for the UK government  and Westminster parliament.  Should the UK 2015 election extend to Scotland (still part of the UK in 2015); and if so, for how long will those Scottish MPs serve in the next Parliament?

Multi option referendum, including Devolution Max

Should there be a multi-option referendum, with a second question on Devo Max?  The UK government says No, because it would be confusing; the Scottish government says it has an open mind.  I suspect the Scottish government wants a second question, because that creates a potential win:win, and gives them a very comfortable fallback.  But there are several difficulties. One is the complexity of multi-option referendums: they risk over-complicating the debate and confusing the voters.  For this reason, 98% of referendums around the world are on a binary question.  Second is the complexity of counting the results: there are four possible voting systems for a three way referendum, each with different outcomes.  The one regarded by electoral experts as the fairest, the Condorcet system, is the least likely to be chosen (a) because it was invented by a Frenchman (b) because it includes a choice between independence and Devo max, unpalatable to Salmond.  The third difficulty is the uncertainty surrounding Devo Max: it suits the SNP to leave it gloriously undefined, and sadly it seems unlikely the Unionist parties are going to do the hard work necessary to come up with a Calman plus or Calman max package.  The fourth is that Devo Max depends heavily on the UK government as the other partner: a detailed prospectus could only be produced after detailed negotiations with the UK government.

That leads me onto my final point.  I wonder whether a realistic prospectus for independence could be produced save after negotiations with the UK government.  Because the SNP now rightly talk about interdependence being a strong feature of independence.  When pressed on important aspects of Scotland after independence, they often fall back on shared services: the pound, the Bank of England, sharing in the UK’s defence forces, etc. This formula has been dubbed ‘The Queen and other shared services’.  The people of Scotland need to know if the UK will agree to share these services, and on what terms.  The independence negotiations will cover very big issues: how to divide the National Debt, North Sea oil, will the UK support Scotland continuing in membership of the EU, etc.  In our book we concluded that there needed to be a second referendum, once the detailed terms of independence had been hammered out, so the people of Scotland could decide if they wanted independence on these terms.

There is now a further argument for a second referendum, if the Scottish government insists on a multi-option referendum which can lead to an uncertain result.  Using a second round binary referendum after the initial multi-option referendum was the solution in Newfoundland, Guam, New Zealand and now recommended by a US Presidential Commission for Puerto Rico.  It allows time for the favoured option to become better defined, and brings the clarity and focus of the binary back to the final debate and vote.

But the Scottish government and the UK government both reject the case for a second referendum.  The Scottish government rejects it as an obstructive device, placing a further obstacle in the way.  The UK government think that if the people of Scotland vote Yes in the first referendum, even if it were only an indicative referendum to trigger negotiations, that would create an unstoppable political momentum which could not be reversed.  So am I being too logical and rational in arguing for a fully informed democratic debate before the final decision: is the second referendum another issue on which I should consider changing my mind?


[1] The Scottish Executive, Your Scotland: Your Referendum (January 2012), Available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0038/00386122.pdf

[2] The Scotland Office, ‘Scotland’s constitutional future’ HM Government (January 2012), Available at http://www.scotlandoffice.gov.uk/scotlandoffice/files/17779-Cm-8203.pdf

[3] The Scottish Executive, Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National Conversation (August 2007), Available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/194791/0052321.pdf

[4] Constitutional Law Group, ‘G Anderson et al: The Independence Referendum, Legality, and the Contested Constitution: Widening the Debate’ UK Constitutional Law (31 January 2012), Available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-referendum-legality-and-the-contested-constitution-widening-the-debate/

[5] K Stacey, ‘Jim Wallace: Salmond holding his own referendum would be undemocratic’ Financial Times (January 16 2012), Available at http://blogs.ft.com/westminster/2012/01/jim-wallace-salmond-holding-his-own-referendum-would-be-undemocratic/#axzz1otiZlWSm

[6] S Johnson, ‘Aiden O’Neill QC: Independence Referendum is probably illegal’ Telegraph, (8 November 2011), Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8876213/Aidan-ONeill-QC-Independence-referendum-is-probably-illegal.html

[7] A Tomkins, ‘The Scottish Parliament and the Independence Referendum’ UK Constitutional Law (12 January 2012), Available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/12/adam-tomkins-the-scottish-parliament-and-the-independence-referendum/

[8] Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Referendum on Scottish independence’, 24th Report of Session 2010-2012 HL (17 February 2012), Available at  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconst/263/263.pdf

UCL Insights

UCL Insights newsletter 08 March 2012: view the full newsletter

FOI: university challenged

Running alongside our current project looking at FOI and universities, is the Justice Committee’s own review into the impact of FOI on the UK. This has presented us with some good opportunities – firstly to showcase our research into FOI over the last 6 years, and secondly, giving us the chance to see what public bodies think of FOI via their submissions to the committee.

The Higher Education sector is well-represented in the 112 submissions the committee received. Well, over represented if anything. Almost 200,000 FOI requests a year are received by local government (according to our estimates), and yet only three councils (Leeds, Birmingham and Kent) made submissions. Universities, or their representative bodies, make up a quarter of all submissions to the committee, but receive vastly fewer requests, looking at the latest data.

While most public authorities responding to the call for evidence – including universities – focussed on common themes (vexatious requests; fees and charging; commercial/media use), some universities were unique in calling for them to be taken out of FOI altogether (Durham, Essex, Reading), or at least have specific exemptions applied to some of its activities (colloquially known as the ‘BBC-style’). The latter has been attempted through an amendment to the current Protection of Freedoms Bill. Universities UK pushed for an exemption within section 22 of the Act, to protect research findings from ‘premature’ publication through FOI. (The amendment was based on a similar clause in the Scottish FOI Act 2002). The amendment failed to attract government support.

Our project, through speaking to academics, university managers and officials, FOI officers, bloggers, requesters, media and open-data enthusiasts, has uncovered some interesting ideas about what it means to conduct research in the public domain and the pressure on universities to remain ‘competitive’. We’re also uncovering what requesters want from universities and academics, and how this might inform the place of universities within the ‘public sector’.

Looking in more detail at the submissions made by the Higher Education sector to the committee, their changing funding arrangements appear crucial to the way they view FOI.

FOI applies to all information ‘held’ by the University, irrespective of the source of funding for its activities, whether those be research programmes, teaching, or innovation. Universities make the argument that this can cause tension in their relationship with private funders when negotiating contracts and during the course of the research itself. They fear that this could lead to a “…reduction in the amount of private funding received at a time when the amount of public money being allocated to higher education has been reduced dramatically.”(University of Bristol submission)

Further, some Universities outlined the falling percentage of their funding or turnover that is derived from public sources and linked this to the appropriateness of being covered by FOI. The 1994 Group noted that public funds for teaching this year would only contribute 22 per cent to overall teaching income: “Given this, it may be more appropriate in future for some areas of higher education activity such as teaching to be exempted from FOIA legislation.”

Private providers in the HE market also constitute a problem – in receipt of public funds through student loans, yet not covered by FOI.

Competition can only be fair and effective if all institutions are operating on a level playing field, subject to the same regulations. The question of how the FOIA should be applied to a more diverse set of higher education providers needs resolving as a matter of urgency.” (UUK submission)

Where the Justice Committee will go on FOI is anyone’s guess. But the HE sector was successful in gaining an opportunity to give oral evidence to the Committee, taking one of the coveted four slots.

The sector’s hopes to change the way they’re covered by FOI (in some way) is running concurrently to the many open-data initiatives of academic disciplines and research councils. The other main area of concern for universities regarding FOI – access to research data – is something we’re continuing to investigate. In the meantime, you can read summaries of some other notable submissions to the Justice Committee, and watch Ben Worthy, Robert Hazell and Jim Amos give their evidence to the Committee on our website.

Recent Judicial Independence Seminars: ‘Law, Politics and the Future of Human Rights Act’ and ‘Judicial Independence and Judicial Appointments’

The Judicial Independence Project recently held two seminars for politicians, judges, lawyers and academics, run under the Chatham House Rule. The first, on ‘Law, Politics and the Future of the Human Rights Act’ on 2 February, was jointly organised with Prof Dawn Oliver and Middle Temple. The headline conclusion was that most speakers expected that the Coalition Government’s Commission on a British Bill of Rights would come to nothing, leaving the Human Rights Act (HRA) intact. The nature of Britain’s international human rights obligations – under the Convention but also increasingly, and much more directly, under EU law – entail that Britain cannot really take away from Convention rights but can only add to them. However, some thought that there was still a possibility that the HRA might be weakened after the current process.

Several speakers also argued that the UK courts are not obliged to follow the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in every circumstance, and that Lord Bingham’s argument to this effect in the Ullah case was wrong. The UK could make greater use of the margin of appreciation afforded by the Convention to member states. However, there was also positive reference to the dialogue that occurred between the UK Supreme Court in connection with the Al Khawaja and Horncastle cases.

Speakers also acknowledged the phenomenon of public discontent with the HRA. This discontent is based mainly on perception rather than substance and survey evidence reveals very high support for human rights but poor support for the HRA itself, and poor understanding of the Act. But politicians will not ignore this public discontent while it exists.

The second seminar was on ‘Judicial Independence and Judicial Appointments’. Speakers commented on the vulnerability of the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC). The Commissionis a young organisation but has already been reviewed by the Ministry of Justice (in 2010; the result was positive) and included, and then excluded, from the Public Bodies Bill as part of a list of quangos that were potentially to be abolished. As one speaker put it ‘we’ve planted a daffodil and a number of times we’ve pulled the daffodil out of the ground to review whether or not it’s working’. The JAC needs time to develop and establish itself.

There was some discussion about the role of Parliament in appointments. Some participants (although not all) felt that judges currently have too much involvement in appointment and argued that judicial independence does not require the involvement of judges in the selected of their successors. One suggested that a greater role for the Lord Chancellor and Parliament in appointments would be of benefit to judges. By increasing the legitimacy of appointments and by getting politicians to invest in the process, judges would gain some protection from conflict with politicians. It was suggested that UK Supreme Court justices, in particular, should not be appointed without the approval of a select committee.

You can read short notes of both of these seminars on the Project website:

Law, Politics and the Future of the Human Rights Act

Judicial Independence and Judicial Appointments

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